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ABSTRACT
This Article suggests that there is Proper Methodology that courts apply when
reviewing cases at the intersection of due process and equal protection. Briefly,
courts operate under a rule that heightened review applies if either a fundamental
right or a suspect class is involved in a case, and that rational basis review applies
if neither is involved (the "Rule"). Two primary exceptions to the Rule exist, and this
Article identifies them as the "Logical" and "Ill Motives" Exceptions. The Logical
Exception applies when a court need not apply heightened review because a law fails
rational basis review. The Ill Motives Exception applies when a law fails rational
basis review because the sole purpose behind a law is an ill motive. The Rule and the
Exceptions provide the Proper Methodology to be applied in intersection cases.
The genesis for the Article arose in the context of analyzing the constitutionality
of laws that ban marriage between persons of the same sex, popularly called "gay
marriage." Notwithstanding the fact that the right to marry is a fundamental right,
confusion exists as to whether gay marriage bans are subject to rational basis review
or heightened scrutiny. Some of the confusion exists because the Supreme Court has
not decided where sexual orientation fits in the equal protection paradigm. But this
void is responsible for only part of the confusion. This Article exposes another dan-
gerous source of confusion-a tendency to allow popular discourse to shape the legal
analysis in sexual orientation discrimination cases, resulting in what this Article calls
the "Collapsible Error." Courts commit the Collapsible Error when they conflate the
equal protection question ("Are gays a suspect class?") into the due process question
("Is there an underlying fundamental right?") by defining the underlying right by the
group targeted by the law-gay marriage-and then limiting the analysis to sub-
stantive due process ("Is there a fundamental right to gay marriage?"). This Article
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explores why committing the Collapsible Error is a denial of the due process and
equal protection rights of gays because it results in an unjustifiable deviation from the
Proper Methodology that is applied in cases involving other types of discrimination.
Understanding and applying the Proper Methodology is not only a matter ofjudicial
integrity, but it also is an opportunity to bring gays into the Constitution's fold.
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WHITHER SEXUAL ORIENTATION ANALYSIS?
INTRODUCTION
Why does the question of the constitutionality of a state ban on marriage between
persons of the same sex (the "Ban Case")' cause intellectual disarray with respect to
the analysis that should apply to evaluate it? After all, the Supreme Court has held
that laws that infringe on fundamental rights, including the choice to marry,2 must
pass heightened scrutiny. This observation reflects a methodological rule that
requires courts to apply heightened scrutiny if either a fundamental right or a suspect
class is targeted by the underlying law and apply rational basis review if neither is
involved (the "Rule"). 4 Under the Rule, no one who takes the Court seriously would
doubt that the question of the constitutionality of a law that prohibited gays from
voting would be subject to heightened scrutiny.' A law that prohibited gays from
using contraceptives,6 from procreating,7 or from directing the upbringing of their
children8 also presumably would have to pass heightened scrutiny to be constitu-
tional.9 The Rule explains why many people might agree that heightened scrutiny
would apply in these examples even though the Court has not ruled specifically on
those issues. Because all of those rights are fundamental, the cases would call for
heightened scrutiny.
' Some states have marriage laws that are neutral on their face but have been interpreted
to mean marriage between a man and a woman. See, e.g., Baker v. Vermont, 744 A.2d 864,
869 (Vt. 1999) ("Fhese statutes... reflect the common understanding that marriage under
Vermont law consists of a union between a man and a woman."). Some states have passed
initiatives to define marriage as between a man and a woman. See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 300
(West 2007); MINN. STAT. § 517.01 (2007); NEv. REV. STAT. ANN. § 122.020 (2007). Other
states have passed laws that explicitly prohibit same sex marriages. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN.
§ 19-3-3.1 (2002); IND. CODE § 31-11-1-1 (2007); VA. CODE ANN. § 20-45.2 (2007). For a
thorough discussion of the status of this movement at the state level as of early 2007, see Mark
Strasser, State Marriage Amendments and Overreaching: On Plain Meaning, Good Public
Policy, and Constitutional Limitations, 25 LAw. & INEQ. 59 (2007).
2 Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978) (applying heightened scrutiny to strike down
a law requiring residents who had not paid non-custodial child support to obtain court approval
to marry).
' The important point in this Article focuses on the difference between rational basis review
and heightened scrutiny, whether intermediate or strict. Accordingly, I use the term "heightened
scrutiny" to include intermediate and strict scrutiny unless otherwise noted. Similarly, the term
"suspect class" includes quasi-suspect classes unless otherwise noted.
4 Occasionally, the Court articulates the Rule. See, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620,
631 (1996) ("[Ihf a law neither burdens a fundamental right nor targets a suspect class, we
will uphold the legislative classification so long as it bears a rational relation to some legitimate
end.").
' See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
6 See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
7 See Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
8 See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
9 Arguably, such laws would fall into the ill Motives Exception, discussed infra Part I.C.2.
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Some of the confusion with respect to the Ban Case is caused by the lack of a
clear holding by the Court on whether sexual orientation is or is not a suspect or quasi-
suspect classification. Some people read Romer v. Evans'° and Lawrence v. Texas"
to stand for the proposition that sexual orientation is neither, and that therefore sexual
orientation classifications are merely subject to rational basis review under the Rule.12
Otherreaders of Romer and Lawrence, including myself, question these conclusions. 3
Also contributing to the confusion is an uncertainty under substantive due process
analysis about whether to define the underlying right broadly (marriage) or nar-
rowly (gay marriage).' 4 A broad definition of the right presents a greater intellectual
challenge for most people, while a narrower definition enables many to dismiss the
question as silly. 5
10 517 U.S. 620 (1996). The Romer Court struck down, under rational basis review,
Colorado's Amendment 2, which prohibited enactment of laws protecting gays from sexual
orientation discrimination. Id.; see infra Part I.C.3.
11 539 U.S. 558 (2003). The Lawrence Court struck down, under rational basis review,
a Texas law that criminalized consensual sodomy between adults of the same sex in the privacy
of the home. Id.; see infra Part I.C. 1.
12 See, e.g., Seymour v. Holcomb, 790 N.Y.S.2d 858 (2005), affd, 811 N.Y.S.2d 134
(App. Div. 2006) (analyzing a challenge to the prohibition on same-sex marriage, the court
cited Lawrence and Romer for the proposition that sexual orientation discrimination is subject
to rational basis review).
3 See, e.g., Laurence H. Tribe, Lawrence v. Texas: The "Fundamental Right" That Dare
Not Speak Its Name, 117 HARV. L. REv. 1893, 1916-17 (2004) (describing the Court's standard
of review as "mysterious"); see also Suzanne B. Goldberg, Equality Without Tiers, 77 S. CAL.
L. REv. 481 (2004); Recent Case, Equal Protection-Sexual Orientation-Kansas Supreme
Court Invalidates Unequal Punishments for Homosexual and Heterosexual Teenage Sex
Offenders, 119 HARv. L. REv. 2276 (2006) (exploring confusion over what level of review
to apply in sexual orientation discrimination cases because of Lawrence). Moreover, the law in
Romer was unconstitutional because it was enacted with animus toward gays, and the Court
has held that harming an unpopular group for the sake of hurting them is never justification
for a law. U.S. Dept. of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528,534 (1973). Similarly, if a law cannot
pass rational basis review, there is no reason to ask whether it would pass a higher standard of
review, even if one theoretically applies. Justices Stevens and Rehnquist articulate the Rule
in their Cleburne concurrence. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432,
452-53 (1985) (Stevens, J., concurring).
14 Compare WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., THE CASE FOR SAME-SEX MARRIAGE: FROM
SEXUALLIBERTYTO CIVIIZED COMMITMENT 123-52 (1996) (defining the right broadly) with
Lynn D. Wardle, A Critical Analysis of Constitutional Claims for Same-Sex Marriage, 1996
BYU L. REv. 1,28-39 (defining the right narrowly). This Article uses the term "gay" to include
gay men, lesbians, and bisexuals.
15 See, e.g., Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 605 (Thomas, J., dissenting) ("[T]he law before the
Court today 'is... uncommonly silly."' (quoting Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479,527
(1965) (Stewart, J., dissenting))). The Court is split over the question of how broadly or nar-
rowly rights should be defined under substantive due process. See Michael H. v. Gerald D.,
491 U.S. 110, 127 n.6 (1981) (referring to Brennan's dissent, Justice Scalia noted that "Justice
Brennan criticizes our methodology in using historical traditions specifically relating to the
[Vol. 16:685
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Significantly, this Article suggests that much of the confusion stems from a
deeper problem lurking in the analysis: the possibility of committing the Collapsible
Error. This error is made when the underlying right at issue is defined by the group
targeted by the law: gay marriage, for example. In popular discourse, everyone
understands what is meant by gay marriage. But in legal discourse, this tendency
to reduce a group to an adjective that is then used to describe a right, has proven to be
dangerous. This happened in Bowers v. Hardwick, in which the Court ostensibly
skipped the equal protection analysis by conflating it into the due process analysis
and holding that there is no fundamental right to engage in homosexual sodomy.' 6
Surprisingly, although the Lawrence Court avoided the Collapsible Error and even
overruled Bowers, 7 the potential to collapse substantive due process and equal
protection analyses into one analysis lingers in sexual orientation discrimination
cases. Is it any wonder that the popular description of marriage between two people
of the same sex as "same-sex marriage" or "gay marriage" has contributed to the
conflation of the legal concepts of rights (marriage) versus people (gays) and the
associated analytical frameworks for analyzing them-substantive due process and
equal protection, respectively?
8
Unraveling the reasons for the present confusion over the methodology to apply
in the Ban Case leads to an alarming observation: there is no prescribed methodology
for analyzing sexual orientation discrimination cases. For mysterious reasons, many
people think the Rule does not apply, and the level of review that would apply in
sexual orientation discrimination cases remains unknown. It is as if gays are extra-
constitutional. In a society that values equal citizenship, 9 how did gays become
vulnerable to such methodological uncertainty about their constitutional status?
This Article offers a path toward greater intellectual clarity to understand the
Proper Methodology that should be applied to cases at the intersection of due process
and equal protection, particularly those involving sexual orientation discrimination.2 °
rights of an adulterous natural father, rather than inquiring more generally 'whether parenthood
is an interest that historically has received our attention and protection"').
16 478 U.S. 186 (1986), overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
17 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578.
'" This might be one way to interpret Professor Robert Post's observation that the Lawrence
Court departed from its "sharp bifurcation between 'fundamental' liberty interests and other
liberty interests." Robert C. Post, Foreword: Fashioning the Legal Constitution: Culture,
Courts, and Law, 117 HARV. L. REV. 4, 96 (2003). Nor is he alone in trying to figure out the
analytical rule that derives from Lawrence. See, e.g., Tribe, supra note 13, at 1917 ("[Tihe
strictness of the Court's standard in Lawrence... could hardly have been more obvious.").
Clearly, I respectfully disagree with Professor Tribe and think Lawrence fails rational basis
review.
19 See generally KENNETH L. KARST, BELONGING TO AMERICA: EQUAL CITIZENSHIP AND
THE CONSTrrTON (1989) (exploring the importance of equal citizenship for everyone).
20 Perhaps it is easy to think that equal protection and due process intersect in relatively
few cases that are easily discernible and, consequently, present little doubt about what standard
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Part I analyzes a variety of Supreme Court cases at the intersection of due process and
equal protection to demonstrate how the Rule evolved. The Rule is at the core of the
Proper Methodology, and application of it is the relatively easy part of the method-
ology, particularly in obvious intersection cases. An obvious case is one in which
the standard of review is established under the Rule. In contrast, a non-obvious case
is one in which the Court has not established whether the underlying right is fun-
damental and also has not decided whether the targeted group is a suspect class.
Naturally, a court can revisit a settled issue and treat the case as a non-obvious one.
Because many people are confused about whether the Ban Case is an obvious or a
non-obvious case, it invites deeper probing.
Thus, to completely understand the source of confusion in some intersection
cases, like the Ban Case, one must also understand additional aspects of the Proper
Methodology. One aspect involves two primary exceptions to the Rule, which I also
lay out in Part 1.21 The first exception arises in obvious cases in which heightened
review theoretically applies, or in a non-obvious case might theoretically apply, but
the laws are struck down because they lack a legitimate state interest. I call this the
"Logical Exception," because when a court finds a law cannot pass rational basis
review, logically, it is unnecessary for the court to evaluate the law under a higher
level of review even though one theoretically applies or might apply. The Court
relies on this Exception, although it has not couched it this way. For example, this
Exception is consistent with the Court's fundamental principle that it generally will
not unnecessarily decide constitutional questions (the "Principle").22
of review to apply. In reality, equal protection and due process are inextricably intertwined
in many cases. Professor Laurence Tribe suggests they are "profoundly interlocked in a legal
double helix." Tribe, supra note 13, at 1898. Consequently, it is important to keep the analyses
separate. Even rights that derive from state or congressional law-non-fundamental rights-
must meet equal protection requirements. A state law that allows only women to drive cars
would have to be justified under intermediate scrutiny. It is especially important not to fall into
the trap that non-fundamental rights are within the domain of states' sovereignty and therefore
beyond equal protection strictures. The probability of falling into this trap increases if the under-
lying classification involves neither suspect nor quasi-suspect classes, because rational basis
review applies under both due process and equal protection. Even in such cases, however, it is
important to consider whether an Exception to the Rule applies, both of which are explored
infra at Part I.C.
2 One other exception also exists: cases in which the Court applies a higher standard than
called for given the underlying right and the class affected. Plyler v. Doe, is the classic example
of this because the Court applied heightened review (under the guise of rational basis review)
to strike down a state law that prohibited children of illegal immigrants from attending public
school. 457 U.S. 202 (1982). Litigants who receive the benefit of the application of a higher
standard than called for under the Rule have no cause for alleging a denial of their due process
or equal protection rights.
22 See, e.g., Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., 472 U.S. 491, 501 (1985) (holding that the
Ninth Circuit erred in invalidating a law in its entirety instead of only partially, and stating that
the Circuit Court had "formulate[d] a rule of constitutional law broader than is required by the
[Vol. 16:685
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The second exception to the Rule arises in cases where the underlying law is ill-
motivated; I call this the "Ill Motives Exception." Prejudice and hostility by govern-
ment officials are illegitimate motives, but there is a difference between a judicial
finding that a law lacks a legitimate interest and a judicial finding that a law is ill-
motivated. I suggest that the difference is relevant and that the Court, on occasion, has
embraced this Exception. For example, under the Dormant Commerce Clause, the
Court has explicitly held that a state law that intends to discriminate against inter-
state commerce in favor of its own interests is essentially per se unconstitutional.23
Under equal protection analysis, the significance of a judicial finding of an ill motive
is ambiguous. Although the Court has not articulated a "per se unconstitutional" rule
under equal protection, it clearly denounces ill motives.24
Part 1I focuses primarily on understanding how the Proper Methodology-the
Rule, the Exceptions, the Principle, and the Collapsible Error-applies and should be
followed in non-obvious cases. Courts deciding such cases have critical analytical
choices to make. Assuming one of the Exceptions does not apply, a court must ascer-
tain whether a case falls within the "either/or" or the "neither/nor" part of the Rule
to know what level of review to apply. For example, if a court asks whether the
underlying right is fundamental and answers the question "yes," then heightened
review would apply under the Proper Methodology, and under the Principle, there
would be no need to address the suspect classification issue. If it answers the question
"no," however, then the Rule would require it to ask the equal protection question to
decide whether a suspect classification is involved because if so, then heightened
review would be required.
Conversely, if a court asks the equal protection question first and finds a suspect
classification, then heightened review would apply and obviate the need to explore
the fundamental rights question. If it does not find a suspect classification, how-
ever, the Rule would require the court to proceed to analyze the fundamental rights
question, because heightened review would apply if a fundamental right were
involved. Realize, it is possible for a court to proceed down both paths and find
neither a fundamental right nor a suspect classification, which would place the case
under the "neither/nor" part of the Rule. Clearly, whether a court proceeds down the
precise facts to which it is to be applied"). The Principle also is relevant under doctrines such
as the "Adequate and Independent State Grounds" rule. See, e.g., Fox Film Corp. v. Muller,
296 U.S. 207, 210 (1935) ("[Wlhere the judgment of a state court rests upon two grounds,
one of which is federal and the other non-federal in character, our jurisdiction fails if the non-
federal ground is independent of the federal ground and adequate to support the judgment.").
23 See, e.g., City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617,624 (1978) ("[W]here simple
economic protectionism is effected by state legislation, a virtually per se rule of invalidity has
been erected." (citing a list of cases)).
24 The existence of an ill-motive will trigger heightened scrutiny in an otherwise facially
neutral law. See Pers. Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979) (sex); Washington v. Davis, 426
U.S. 229 (1976) (race).
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substantive due process or the equal protection path first-or proceeds down only
one of those paths when it should explore both under the Proper Methodology--can
affect the general development of equal protection and substantive due process juris-
prudence. Figures are attached to assist in understanding how the different parts of
the Proper Methodology relate to each other. Figure 1 illustrates the Rule,25 Figure 2
illustrates the Exceptions,26 and Figure 3 illustrates the Collapsible Error problem.
27
Unless the Proper Methodology in all of its aspects is understood and applied
correctly in intersection cases, it is likely that lower courts will replicate some of the
Court's prior "improper" methodologies.28 The Ban Case illustrates how terribly
unjust the application of an improper methodology can be in particular contexts,
raising concerns about judicial integrity. By "judicial integrity" I mean exploring
and exposing possible biases judges might have toward particular groups that result
in deviations from the Proper Methodology. In some instances, perhaps most, the
biases can be the result of reflexive or unreflective responses to ingrained lessons.29
The lessons fall on a continuum, with stereotypical thinking about particular groups
on one end and actual beliefs in the superiority of some groups and the inferiority of
others at the opposite end.3" For purposes of this Article, I will refer to the ingrained
lessons as the "normalization of differences."31 By disrupting old thought patterns,
perhaps greater understanding can be obtained, and in turn, the normalization of
25 See Figure 1 infra p. 744.
26 See Figure 2 infra p. 745.
27 See Figure 3 infra p. 745.
28 This Article does not explore the possibilities of improving upon the current method-
ology. See Goldberg, supra note 13, at 484 (suggesting one standard of review); Toni M.
Massaro, Gay Rights, Thick and Thin, 49 STAN. L. REv. 45 (1996) (arguing for application
of rational basis review to evaluate anti-gay legislation for the purpose of avoiding confusion
and getting to the crux of the matter: "What is wrong with homosexuality?").
29 See, e.g., LESLIE HOUTS PICCA & JOE R. FEAGIN, TWO-FACED RACISM: WHITES IN THE
BACKSTAGE AND FRONTSTAGE (2007) (describing extensive social science study document-
ing how whites are more likely to express racist sentiments behind closed doors-backstage).
Naturally, judges-like legislators, commentators, and all people-evaluate cases from non-
neutral views, although the biases inherent in this are not always made evident. See MARTHA
MINOW, MAKING ALLTHE DIFFERENCE: INCLUSION, EXCLUSION, AND AMERICAN LAW (1990);
Suzanne B. Goldberg, Constitutional Tipping Points: Civil Rights, Social Change, and Fact-
Based Adjudication, 106 COLuM. L. REv. 1955 (2006).
'0 The idea of a continuum also forms the basis for John H. Ely's exploration of the role
of prejudice in political process theory. See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST:
A THEORY OFJUDICIALREVIEW 135-79 (1980) (proposing that first-degree prejudice consists
of hostility and second-degree prejudice consists of stereotyping). The purpose of my Article
is not to suggest what is or is not meritorious about any particular theory. Rather, my purpose
is to explore where the Court deviates from its own methodology.
3" See, e.g., Devon W. Carbado, Black Rights, Gay Rights, Civil Rights, 47 UCLA L. REV.
1467 (2000) (exploring how heterosexuality is normalized in such a way that it marginalizes
the experiences of gays who are black).
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differences among people will be less likely to unfairly influence judges' decision-
making, particularly in ways that promote the biases.32 Understanding the Proper
Methodology in intersection cases is important, and in the context of the Ban Case,
it is time to bring gays, at a minimum, into the Constitution's analytical fold.33
I. THE EVOLUTION OF THE PROPER METHODOLOGY
A. From Rational Basis Review to Footnote Four
3 4
Chief Justice John Marshall established the concept of rational basis review quite
poignantly in McCulloch v. Maryland: "Let the end be legitimate, let it be within
the scope of the constitution, and all means which are appropriate, which are plainly
adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but consist [sic] with the letter and spirit
of the constitution, are constitutional."3 Although an Article I case, the concept of
rational basis review-the idea that all legislation at a minimum must be rationally
related to a legitimate government purpose-generally is not controversial. Minimum
judicial review to evaluate the constitutionality of laws is consistent with preserving
32 Judges, including Supreme Court Justices, have shown significantly greater understanding
over time about the role sexist stereotyping has played in the oppression of both women and
men. Compare Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908) (holding that it is lawful to restrict the
hours women could work in laundries because of their sex) with Nevada Dep't of Human Res.
v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721 (2003) (holding that the Family Medical Leave Act successfully abro-
gates the state's sovereign immunity because the record established that employers continue to
discriminate against men and women based on stereotypes). This is not to say the stereotypes
do not win out on occasion, as they arguably did in Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53 (2001) (holding
that children born out-of-wedlock are automatically given citizenship if the mother is a citizen,
but the father must establish citizenship).
31 Professor Cass R. Sunstein supports the Court's decision in Romer to strike down
Amendment 2 for failing to pass rational basis review under his view that sometimes it is
better to leave things undecided. See Cass R. Sunstein, Foreword: Leaving Things Undecided,
110 HARV. L. REv. 4 (1996). His analysis of Romer fits closely with my suggestion that
Romer-as well as U.S. Department ofAgriculture v. Moreno, 413 US. 528 (1973) and City
of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432 (1985)-belongs in the Ill Motives
Exception, explored infra at Part I.C.2. Specifically, he states that the RomerCourt's "rationality
review, traditionally little more than a rubber stamp, is used to invalidate badly motivated
laws without refining a new kind of scrutiny." Sunstein, supra at 61. If Romer stood for the
proposition that discrimination based on animus toward gays is per se unconstitutional, then
the status of gays under the Constitution would not be undecided. In fact, it would be a profound
statement by the Court on the equal citizenship status of gays. Unfortunately, as this Article
explores, it is not clear that Romer stands for this; therefore I argue that leaving the question
of gays' analytical status under the Constitution undecided is itself a denial of due process and
equal protection.
M United States v. Carolene Prod. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
3 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) 316, 421 (1819).
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the supremacy of federal law, particularly the Constitution, a principle also at the heart
of McCulloch.36
In contrast, the application of minimum review has always been somewhat con-
troversial, raising such questions as: What is a legitimate end? How closely does the
fit between the law and the end need to be? Is a conceivable purpose sufficient or
must the purpose be actual?37 What is rational basis with "teeth"? Even Chief Justice
Marshall acknowledged that laws enacted under pretexts would be unconstitutional.38
Moreover, aside from pretextual laws, and even before the incorporation of the
Bill of Rights and the expansion of substantive due process to include implied funda-
mental rights, the Court, under the rubric of rational basis review, "strictly scru-
tinized" cases that touched on especially important substantive rights. For example,
in 1887 in Mugler v. Kansas, the Court upheld a state law that banned alcohol, pre-
sumably a legitimate end of the state's police power.39 Mugler is significant because
it was a harbinger of things to come in Lochner v. New York,40 as articulated by the
first Justice Harlan who admonished that it is the duty of the courts to adjudge a
state's exercise of its police powers that "has no real or substantial relation to [the
public morals, health or safety]," or is a "palpable invasion of rights secured by the
fundamental law."
41
Similarly, before creation of the concept of suspect classifications, the Court
"strictly scrutinized" laws that burdened racial minorities. The 1879 case of Strauder
v. West Virginia illustrates this. 42 In Strauder, the Court struck down a state law that
prohibited black men from serving on juries in criminal trials.43 Significantly, the
decision challenged the reality of a white society that condoned racial discrimination
and preferred that the races live separately, a preference the Court would constitu-
tionalize less than twenty years later in Plessy v. Ferguson.44 Separation of the races
was quite rational to white society at the time. Thus, Strauder is a remarkable judicial
stand against racism at a time when rational basis review was the only articulated
methodology.
In addition to finding an implied fundamental right to contract in Lochner at the
turn of the twentieth century,45 the Court at that time also began to incorporate some
of the Bill of Rights into the concept of "liberty" under the due process clause of the
36 Id. at 327.
" The Court has held that any conceivable purpose will suffice. See Williamson v. Lee
Optical Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 487 (1955).
38 McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) at 324.
" 123 U.S. 623 (1887).
40 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
41 Id. at 68 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (quoting Mugler, 123 U.S. at 661) (upholding a law that
prohibited intoxicating beverages).
42 100 U.S. 303 (1879).
41 Id. at 310.
44 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
4' Lochner, 198 U.S. at 53.
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Fourteenth Amendment.46 The growing judicial acknowledgment that some rights,
ultimately termed "fundamental rights," are more important than others understand-
ably demanded that the Court use a procedural methodology to give greater judicial
scrutiny when evaluating the constitutionality of laws that burdened those especially
important rights. Justice Stone's insights in footnote four in United States v. Carolene
Products in 1938 expressed this need for heightened scrutiny when laws infringe on
certain rights.47 Moreover, Justice Stone's insights also extended to equal protection
and the need for heightened scrutiny when laws target discrete and insular minorities
as they did in Strauder.4 8 His famous footnote four captures his insights:
It is unnecessary to consider now whether legislation which re-
stricts those political processes which can ordinarily be expected
to bring about repeal of undesirable legislation, is to be subjected
to more exacting judicial scrutiny under the general prohibitions
of the Fourteenth Amendment than are most other types of legis-
lation.... Nor need we enquire whether similar considerations
enter into the review of statutes directed at particular religious, or
national, or racial minorities, whether prejudice against discrete
and insular minorities may be a special condition, which tends
seriously to curtail the operation of those political processes
ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities, and which may
call for a correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry.49
Footnote four generally is recognized as the source of the Rule; that is, that height-
ened scrutiny should apply in cases where a law infringes on a fundamental right
or burdens a suspect class.50
4 See, e.g., Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925) (holding that the First Amendment
right to freedom of speech and press is incorporated through the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932) (holding that the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel in capital cases is incorporated through the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment).
17 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
48 Professor Michael Klarman demonstrates that the Court initially failed to rely on Justice
Stone's insights in the equal protection area to avoid creating a "presumptive rule against racial
classifications," something white society was unprepared to do before Brown and Loving. See
Michael J. Klarman, An Interpretive History of Modern Equal Protection, 90 MICH. L. REv.
213, 226-41 (1991).
49 Carolene Products, 304 U.S. at 152 n.4 (citations omitted).
50 See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 539-40
(3d ed. 2006); LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTrrUTIONAL LAW 582,769 (2d ed. 1988).
Renowned scholars have written about the limited utility of relying on the methodology sug-
gested in footnote four to attain the ultimate goal to secure the "fairness of pluralist process,"
including a commitment to equal citizenship of discrete and insular minorities. See, e.g., Bruce
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B. The Rule
1. Laying the Foundation
Within a short time, the Court moved the suggestion in Justice Stone's footnote
into the text of constitutional jurisprudence. For example, in Skinner v. Oklahoma the
Court explicitly said it should apply strict scrutiny to evaluate the constitutionality of
a state law that mandated sterilization of repeated larcenists but not repeated em-
bezzlers. 5' Although presented as an equal protection challenge,5 2 the SkinnerCourt
did not defer to the state legislature and simply apply rational basis review, which
presumably would have applied under equal protection because criminals are not a
"discrete and insular" minority within the spirit of footnote four.5 3 Rather, the Court
emphasized, and seemed to be heavily influenced by, the importance of the right at
stake-procreation-which the Court noted is "one of the basic civil rights of man. 54
Moreover, the Court went further and stated that "[m]arriage and procreation are
fundamental to the very existence and survival of the race."55 Notwithstanding
these observations, however, it rightfully held that the law created an irrational dis-
tinction between repeated larcenists and repeated embezzlers.56 Once the Court de-
cided the law was irrational under equal protection, if it had followed the Principle,
it would not have decided the fundamental rights question. In this way, Skinner
truly is an equal protection case, but it is often cited, even by the Court, as the case in
A. Ackerman, Beyond Carolene Products, 98 HARv. L. REV. 713,718 (1985). Most notably,
a critique of footnote four is at the heart of John Ely's book. ELY, supra note 30. This is relevant
to the discussion of what it means for a group to be "politically powerful," infra at Part I.C., a
concept that remains ambiguous and whose deeper analysis is saved for another paper. In many
ways, Professor Ackerman's prediction has come true. Specifically, he opined that if footnote
four is read to suggest that discrimination against discrete and insular minorities would be
justified as long as they eventually attain sufficient voting strength, then persistent prejudice
against them could still be tolerated. See Ackerman, supra at 717. This bolsters the argument
that ill motives, much of the time, are the crux of the problem. See infra Part I.C.
5' 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942).
52 Chief Justice Stone, the author of footnote four, concurred in Skinner and would have
placed the decision on a combination of procedural and substantive due process. Specifically,
because of the importance of the right at stake, he believed that a criminal defendant was
entitled to a hearing to show why he should not be sterilized. Id. at 544-45 (Stone, C.J.,
concurring).
51 In Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987), the Court held that all fundamental rights of
prisoners will be subject to rational basis review for administrative purposes. See also Lewis
v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 361 (1995) (relying on Turner for the same proposition); infra at
Part II.A.
4 Skinner, 316 U.S. at 541 (majority opinion).
55 id.
56 Id. at 542 ("The equal protection clause would indeed be a formula of empty words if
such conspicuously artificial lines could be drawn.").
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which the Court theoretically upped the judicial review ante because of the importance
of the substantive due process right at stake.57
Only a few years later, the Court applied heightened scrutiny to an equal pro-
tection classification based on race. 58 In Korematsu v. United States, the Court ex-
plicitly held that "all legal restrictions which curtail the civil rights of a single racial
group are immediately suspect.... [C]ourts must subject them to the most rigid
scrutiny. ' 59 Koremnatsu was an especially compelling case for the application of strict
scrutiny because it was a "wash" case at the highest level. By this, I mean that strict
scrutiny was bound to apply in the spirit of footnote four, because the law requiring
the exclusion of anyone of Japanese ancestry from certain geographical areas bur-
dened both a suspect class based on race and their fundamental right to liberty. It was
necessary for the Court to analyze the case under equal protection because the only
reason for denying members of the group of their liberty was their Japanese ancestry.
Notwithstanding that this was one of the most difficult cases for the government to
meet its burden of proof, the Court upheld the law. With hindsight, of course, the
government acknowledged its mistake.'
Notably, neither the Skinner nor the Korematsu Courts explicitly articulated the
Rule, but this was the effect of the methodologies applied in those cases. Together,
they mark the Court's implicit adoption of the rule that in cases where due process and
equal protection intersect, courts apply heightened review if either a fundamental right
or a suspect class is involved.6' Outside of such cases, courts generally require that
legislation merely pass rational basis review.62
"7 Justice Stone explicitly opined that the correct inquiry was one of due process. Id. at
544 (Stone, J., concurring); see, e.g., TRIBE, supra note 50, at 1464 (suggesting that the Court
applied strict scrutiny because of fear that the sterilization law could be used to promote
genocide).
58 Professor Michael Klarman notes that the Court first created a presumption against
racial classifications in McLaughlin v. Florida. 379 U.S. 184 (1964) (holding that a state law
prohibiting cohabitation when the man and woman are of different races violates the Fourteenth
Amendment under strict scrutiny); see Klarman, supra note 48, at 255. Interestingly, the
McLaughlin Court cited to Korematsu to hold that racial classifications are subjected to the
"most rigid scrutiny." McLaughlin, 379 U.S. at 192 (citing Korematsu v. United States, 323
U.S. 214, 216 (1944)).
" Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 216. Notwithstanding this language by the Court, some scholars
assert that the Court applied rational basis review. See, e.g., Klarman, supra note 48, at 232
("[N]otwithstanding the grandiose rhetoric, the Court actually applied its most deferential brand
of rationality review [in Korematsu].").
6 See Sharon Elizabeth Rush, The Heart of Equal Protection: Education and Race, 23
N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 1, 53 (1997) (detailing the steps taken by the government).
61 See, e.g., Michael J. Klarman, The Puzzling Resistance to Political-Process Theory, 77
VA. L. REv. 747,749 (1991) (calling Justice Stone's footnote "the seminal statement of political
process theory").
62 A notable exception is Plyler v. Doe, a case in which the Court applied heightened
scrutiny to strike down a state law that excluded undocumented children from its public schools.
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2. The Obvious Intersection Case
Obvious intersection cases are easy to identify. They involve an established
fundamental right and/or a suspect class, or they do not, as decided by the Court. Con-
sider some classic examples of obvious intersection cases involving fundamental rights
and economic legislation. Ordinarily, economic legislation is subject to rational basis
review under equal protection. When economic legislation intersects with clearly
established fundamental rights, however, the Court has applied heightened scrutiny.
Specific examples include cases where the economic legislation infringes on the right
to travel, 63 to marry,64 to parental custody,65 to access to courts in divorce proceed-
ings,66 and to vote.67 Outside of economic legislation, other laws that classify non-
suspect groups also generally must meet heightened scrutiny when the laws intersect
with a fundamental right.68 For example, the Court has held that a state law that limits
voting rights to property owners or to parents must meet strict scrutiny.69
457 U.S. 202 (1982). But even this case arguably comports with the Rule because alienage
classifications are suspect. See Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971).
63 See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 629 (1969) (using strict scrutiny to strike down
a state residency requirement for the receipt of welfare benefits by noting that the state law
implicated the right to interstate travel, although the Court did not feel it necessary to say what
provision of the Constitution guaranteed this right).
6 See Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978) (invalidating a state law that required
payment of past child support before a person could remarry).
65 See M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 124 (1996) (applying heightened scrutiny in a case
where a mother could not afford the fee to file an appeal and risked losing custody of her
children).
66 See Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 377 (1971) ("[A]bsent a countervailing state
interest of overriding significance, persons forced to settle their claims of right and duty through
the judicial process must be given a meaningful opportunity to be heard.") The Court did not
extend this right generally but only because marriage/divorce was at stake. Id. at 376-77.
67 Harper v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 670 (1966) (applying an ambiguous
standard, saying the poll tax was irrelevant to voter qualification, invidious discrimination was
unconstitutional, and whenever a fundamental right was involved, "classifications which might
invade or restrain them must be closely scrutinized and carefully confined").
68 A notable exception to this is the case of prisoners. In Turner v. Safley, the Court held that
laws that burden the fundamental rights of prisoners need only be rationally related to a legiti-
mate penological interest. 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987); see infra Part II.A.
69 Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621 (1969). Interestingly, and in a
different but related context, the Court held that Congress's section 5 enforcement power is
greater in situations where disability discrimination involves a fundamental right. See, e.g., Bd.
of Tr. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001) (striking down Title I of the Americans
with Disabilities Act (ADA) in a suit brought by a woman who was demoted following a leave
to heal from breast cancer); cf Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 529 (2004) (upholding Title
II of the ADA in a suit brought by a paraplegic who was unable to attend a criminal hearing
on the second floor of the courthouse because there was no elevator, stating that "Title II is
aimed at the enforcement of a variety of basic rights, including the right of access to the courts
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Correlatively, when a suspect class is obviously targeted by a law, heightened
review applies even if no fundamental right is involved. Restricting alcohol privi-
leges (clearly not a fundamental right) to men or women calls for heightened review
under equal protection. ° Considering race" or sex7 2 in public school admissions
processes provides further examples where heightened review is utilized even though
education is not a fundamental right.73
Conversely, in obvious cases where neither a fundamental right nor a suspect
class is involved, rational basis review clearly is the operative rule. The standard of
review issue has been particularly focused in the area of economic legislation, which,
as mentioned, generally is subject to rational basis review following the demise of
Lochner. Perhaps the cases in which economic legislation and education intersect
illustrate the Court's insistence on the application of rational basis review to evaluate
laws that do not involve a fundamental right or suspect class. This was poignantly
raised in San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, in which a class
action suit was brought on behalf of poor Mexican-American children who argued
that the Texas public education financing scheme violated equal protection.74 The
Court held that the state scheme was not subject to heightened scrutiny because it
involved neither a fundamental right nor a suspect class.75 Moreover, even though
the Court acknowledged the importance of education to children, citing Brown v.
Board of Education, it was unmoved to subject the law to a higher standard of
review." Under rational basis review, the Court upheld the tax scheme.77
It is not easy for a law to fail rational basis review under the Rule, especially since
the Court has held that any conceivable legitimate purpose will sustain a law.78 City
at issue in this case, that call for a standard of judicial review at least as searching, and in some
cases more searching, than the standard that applies to sex-based classifications").
'0 See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
71 See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
72 See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996).
13 See San Antonio Ind. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 18 (1973).
14 Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 4-5.
" See id. at 28-30.
76 Id. at 20 (citing Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954)) ("[E]ducation is
perhaps the most important function of state and local governments.").
" Id. at 54. In Plyler v. Doe, the Court applied a form of heightened review, mixed with
rational basis review language, to strike down a law that prohibited undocumented children
from attending public schools in Texas unless they paid tuition, even though the Court reiter-
ated that education is not a fundamental right and did not base its standard of review on suspect
classification grounds. 457 U.S. 202 (1982). Justice Brennan concluded that "the discrimination
contained in [the law] can hardly be considered rational unless it furthers some substantial goal
of the State." Id. at 224.
78 See, e.g., Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78 (1911) ("When the
classification.., is called in question, if any state of facts reasonably can be conceived that
would sustain it, the existence of that state of facts at the time the law was enacted must be
assumed."); see also FCC v. Beach Commc'ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307 (1993).
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of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center is often used to illustrate a law that actually
lacks a legitimate state interest.79 At issue in Cleburne was the constitutionality of
the city's denial of a special use permit needed to operate a group home for persons
with "mental retardation."80 The city ordinance did not require a special use permit
for "apartment houses, multiple dwellings, boarding and lodging houses, fraternity or
sorority houses, dormitories, apartment hotels, hospitals, sanitariums, nursing homes
for convalescents or the aged (other than for the insane or feebleminded or alcoholics
or drug addicts), private clubs or fraternal orders, and other specified uses.'
The Court rightfully acknowledged that it is generally legitimate for the state to
take into account real differences in the abilities and needs of persons with mental
retardation compared to other groups.82 However, the Court was persuaded that the
city's denial of the permit, as applied, served no legitimate purpose and was actually
motivated by an irrational prejudice against persons with "mental disabilities. 83 It
made no sense to require a special use permit for the group home for persons with
"mental retardation" and not for any of the other groups.8 4
The Court's methodology was partly proper in Cleburne, although this is less than
clear.8 5 This Article, of course, would place it in the Ill Motives Exception, and the
implications of this are discussed more fully below.86 Holding that analysis, because
79 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
80 Id. at 436-37.
81 Id. at 447.
82 Id. at 444. More generally, this principle is embodied in all laws pertaining to disability
discrimination. For a recent exploration of critical issues in this area, see Ruth Colker, The
Disability Integration Presumption: Thirty Years Later, 154 U. PA. L. REv. 789 (2006);
Michael Ashley Stein & Michael E. Waterstone, Disability, Disparate Impact, and Class
Actions, 56 DUKE L.J. 861 (2006); Symposium, The Americans with Disabilities Act at
15-Past, Present, & Future, 75 MIss. L.J. 917 (2006).
83 Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 450. Because of this, Cleburne would fit better in the Ill Motives
Exception. See infra Part I.C.3.
' See Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 432.
85 Justices Stevens and Rehnquist concur in Cleburne, making it clear that they do not
think the three standards of review (strict scrutiny, intermediate scrutiny, and rational basis)
are sharply defined. Id. at 451 (Stevens, J., concurring). They also explicitly articulated the
Logical Exception to the Rule:
The rational-basis test, properly understood, adequately explains why a
law that deprives a person of the right to vote because his skin has a dif-
ferent pigmentation than that of other voters violates the Equal Protection
Clause. It would be utterly irrational to limit the franchise on the basis of
height or weight; it is equally invalid to limit it on the basis of skin color.
None of these attributes has any bearing at all on the citizen's willingness
or ability to exercise that civil right. We do not need to apply a special
standard, or to apply "strict scrutiny," or even "heightened scrutiny," to
decide such cases.
Id. at 452-53.
86 See infra Part I.C.3.b.
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the Court held the City Council's decision failed rational basis review, under the
Principle, one would not expect the Court to analyze the fundamental rights question
or the suspect classification question. However, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals
applied intermediate scrutiny to the city's decision to deny the permit because the
right at stake (housing), although not fundamental,87 was important,88 and because
persons with "mental retardation" constituted a quasi-suspect class.89 The Cleburne
Court reversed the holding of the Court of Appeals on the quasi-suspect classification
issue9" and, perhaps curiously, did not address the fundamental rights question. But
the Court could have disposed of this quite easily, because it had already decided that
there is no fundamental right to housing in Lindsey v. Normet,9' a case decided thir-
teen years before Cleburne. In Lindsey, the Court explicitly noted "the importance
of decent, safe, and sanitary housing" but nevertheless applied rational basis review
to the equal protection challenge in that case.92
In a nutshell, then, Cleburne represents a case in which the law failed rational
basis review under the Rule. Under the terminology used in this Article, it belongs
in the lll Motives Exception. The Court evaluated the suspect classification question
to correct the lower court's error and did not need to ask whether there is a funda-
mental right to housing because that had already been decided. The Cleburne Court's
methodology was partly proper, but the important point to highlight is that Cleburne
is often used to illustrate how a law can fail rational basis review under the Rule.
3. The Non-Obvious Intersection Case
Recall that non-obvious cases involve rights that are not clearly fundamental
or clearly non-fundamental and groups that are not clearly suspect or clearly not
suspect. In other words, the non-obvious cases involve questions that the Court
has not yet decided. The initial challenge for a court in non-obvious cases is not
to figure out what level of review to apply but rather to figure out whether the case
involves a fundamental right or a suspect class or fits within the Logical or il Motives
Exception.
87 See Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 74 (1972).
88 Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc. v. City of Cleburne, 726 F.2d 191, 199 (5th Cir. 1984), afjd
in part, vacated in part, 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
89 Id. at 193.
9 Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 442. The Fifth Circuit also applied the Proper Methodology by
asking the "either/or" question, but it erred, according to the Supreme Court, in the conclu-
sions it reached. Id. Interestingly, the Court of Appeals found that the mentally retarded fit all
three criteria for suspect classification-immutability, political powerlessness, and history of
discrimination-but held they were only a quasi-suspect class because sometimes it is necessary
to pass legislation that discriminates against them. Cleburne, 726 F.2d at 198. The Appeals
Court also held that heightened scrutiny was appropriate because the right at stake, although not
fundamental, was important. Id. at 199.
9' 405 U.S. 56 (1972).
92 Id. at 74.
2008]
WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL
C. Exceptions to the Rule
1. The Logical Exception
Sometimes it is obvious that a fundamental right or a suspect class is targeted by
a law, normally triggering heightened review under the Rule, but the Court never-
theless strikes down the law because it lacks a legitimate state interest. Cases in this
category fall within the Logical Exception. Logically, it is unnecessary for a court
to apply heightened scrutiny, even though it is theoretically the correct standard, if a
law cannot meet rational basis review.93 For example, imagine a state law that pro-
hibited Capricorns from marrying Leos or a state law that said only vegetarians can
vote in the election for President. Under the Rule, strict scrutiny normally would
apply because the rights to marry and to vote are fundamental, but the cases should
fall into the Logical Exception. Obviously, they cannot pass strict scrutiny because
they cannot even pass rational basis review.
Notice that this Exception does not apply to cases like Cleburne, in which neither
a fundamental right nor a suspect class was targeted by the law, thus requiring rational
basis review to apply under the Rule, which the law failed.94 Those cases simply
lack a legitimate state interest under the Rule.95 Particular care must be taken not to
confuse the two types of cases, because it would be erroneous to subsume a Logical
Exceptions case under the Rule. In obvious cases, like the hypothetical ones above,
the error is of less import, because it is established that heightened review normally
applies and presumably would apply in future cases involving the right to marry or to
vote. No one would suppose, for example, that because a court invoked the Logical
Exception that it also was holding that the underlying right was no longer funda-
mental96 or that the class was no longer suspect. One would expect departures from
precedent of that magnitude to be explicit. And the opposite also holds true. In an
obvious case in which there is no fundamental right or suspect class and the Court
chooses to revisit the issue, it is possible for the case to fit within an Exception and/or
for the Court to hold that, on reconsideration, there is a fundamental right or suspect
class involved. Such cases should be treated like non-obvious cases.
" See, e.g, Hooper v. Bernalillo County Assessor, 472 U.S. 612,618 (1985) (holding that
a residency requirement failed rational basis review so there was no need to apply heightened
review). The Court also has applied this principle to cases that fail intermediate scrutiny. See,
e.g., Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982) (holding that it was unnecessary
to evaluate whether a law that excluded men from nursing school violated strict scrutiny when
it failed intermediate scrutiny).
9 See Cleburne, 473 U.S. 432.
9 See infra Part I.C.3 for a discussion of the role of ill motives in Cleburne.
96 In fact, the Skinner Court struck down the sterilization law because it irrationally treated
embezzlers and larcenists unequally, and in violation of the Principle, the Court explicitly
found a fundamental right to procreation and marriage. See Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S.
535 (1942); see also infra Part II.A.
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This cautionary light shines bright in Lawrence v. Texas, in which the Court held
unconstitutional a state law that criminalized sodomy between persons of the same
sex because the law served no legitimate state interest.97 On the one hand, Lawrence
might seem like an obvious case because the Court held in Bowers that there is no
fundamental right to engage in homosexual sodomy.98 But Lawrence actually is a
non-obvious case because the Bowers Court failed to follow the Proper Methodology
and ask the equal protection question: are gays a suspect class? This failure is attrib-
utable to the Collapsible Error, and I analyze this in detail below.99 Additionally, the
Lawrence Court reconsidered the due process issue in Bowers and overruled it.'00 On
reconsideration, treating it as a non-obvious case, Lawrence belongs in the Logical
Exception.101 Significantly, the Court did not hold that there was no fundamental
right involved, an interpretation Justice Scalia suggests in his dissenting opinion partly
because the Court applied rational basis review and not strict scrutiny.3 2 Admittedly,
it is difficult to articulate exactly what fundamental right is involved in Lawrence,3
but it is clear that the Court placed the interest at stake within the sphere of "liberty"
protected by the Due Process Clause.1 4 As such, Justice Scalia is correct that laws
97 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003).
98 Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
99 See infra Part II.B. 1.
100 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578.
101 To be more exact, I believe Lawrence falls into the Ill Motives Exception, although the
Court down-played the degree of hostility behind the law and focused on the stigma associated
with criminalizing sodomy between persons of the same sex. However, stigma is different from
animus, the motivation behind Colorado's Amendment 2. I explore the importance of this
distinction infra at Part I.C.3.
02 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 586 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("Nor does [the majority] subject the
Texas law to the standard of review that would be appropriate (strict scrutiny) if homosexual
sodomy were a 'fundamental right."').
103 The Court held that "liberty" protects the "right to define one's own concept of existence,
of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life." Id. at 574 (majority opinion)
(quoting Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992)). The Lawrence
Court also speaks of dignity, autonomy, and personhood. Id.; see Marc Spindelman, Surviving
Lawrence v. Texas, 102 MICH. L. REV. 1615 (2004) (providing an excellent analysis of the
possible bases for the decision); see also Nan D. Hunter, Living with Lawrence, 88 MINN. L.
REv. 1103 (2004) (suggesting the opinion lacked clarity); Andrew Koppelman, Lawrence's
Penumbra, 88 MINN. L. REv. 1171, 1180 (2004) (proposing that the opinion suffers from
"poor judicial craftsmanship"); Post, supra note 18, at 106 (acknowledging that the Court
offered different bases for its decision but committed to neither).
"o Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 562. But see Randy E. Barnett, Justice Kennedy's Libertarian
Revolution: Lawrence v. Texas, 2003 CATO Sup. CT. REv. 21 (suggesting that not all liberty
interests are necessarily fundamental and persuasively arguing that Lawrence is a liberty case
that required the state to carry the burden of justifying the law). Professor Barnett suggests
that the Court did not find a fundamental right, but his concomitant suggestion that the law
needed to be subjected to heightened review by shifting the burden to the state is the procedure
used to analyze fundamental rights. Id. Some scholars place Lawrence under the "privacy"
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that infringe on liberty interests normally must pass heightened scrutiny pursuant
to the Rule. The Court did not need to engage in that analysis, however, because the
Logical Exception applied. The Court held that morality could not be a legitimate
reason for the law, 5 and there was no other legitimate reason, either.' °6 It would be
erroneous to conclude that because the Lawrence Court applied rational basis re-
view, no fundamental right was involved. Clearly, it held the law interfered with
the "liberty" rights of the couple.° 7 Similarly, it would be erroneous to conclude that
the Court held that sexual orientation is not a suspect classification, a question it did
not need to answer consistent with the Principle.' In other words, placing a non-
obvious case in the Logical Exception should not be interpreted as ajudicial finding
that the case does not involve a fundamental right or a suspect class. Reliance on
Lawrence to support either proposition in that case is misplaced.
2. The IIl Motives Exception
a. Early Lessons from Race Discrimination
Early in our history, the Court acknowledged that racial prejudice is an illegit-
imate state interest. This was the Strauder Court's primary rationale for striking
down the law that prohibited blacks from serving on juries."° The dictionary defines
"prejudice" to mean a "preconceived opinion that is not based on reason or actual
experience."' "o Today, perhaps a synonym for "prejudice" might be "stereotype,"
which means "a widely held but fixed and oversimplified image or idea of a particular
type of person." 1 ' Increasingly, the Court rejects stereotyping as a legitimate basis
for discriminating, particularly in the area of gender equality."2 The word "prejudice"
umbrella. See, e.g., Jamal Greene, BeyondLawrence: Metaprivacy and Punishment, 115 YALE
L.J. 1862 (2006). One might argue that the Court violated the Principle because it found a
fundamental right. I disagree and suggest the Lawrence Court was correcting what it saw as
an error in Bowers v. Hardwick, where the Court held there was no fundamental right to en-
gage in homosexual sodomy. 478 U.S. 186 (1986). By correcting its mistake in Bowers, the
Lawrence Court, to a large extent, withdrew its participation in the denial of gays' due process
and equal protection rights brought on by that case. See infra Part II.B.3.
0'5 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 577.
'06 Id. at 578.
107 See id.
118 This is far more complicated than presented at this point. See infra Part II.
"09 Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 310 (1879).
"o THE NEW OXFORD DICTIONARY 1344 (2d ed. 2005).
.. Id. at 1670.
112 See, e.g., Nev. Dep't of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 727 (2003) (upholding
Congress's power to abrogate states' sovereign immunity in the Family Medical Leave Act
to counter the discriminatory effects of gender stereotypes); United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S.
515,541 (1996) (holding that the male-only admission policy at Virginia Military Institute was
[Vol. 16:685
WHITHER SEXUAL ORIENTATION ANALYSIS?
at the time of Strauder, of course, carried the full import of white society's belief in
white superiority and the inferiority of people of color, in particular blacks, in ways
that denied their full humanity." 3 In this way, racial prejudice resembled more the
concept of "hostility," which means "unfriendliness or opposition."' 4 It would be in-
accurate and an injustice to describe racial hostility as merely a matter of prejudice.
This became evident only six years later in Yick Wo v. Hopkins, which is a clear
articulation of the principle that racial hostility is an illegitimate motive under equal
protection.1 5 Recall that in Yick Wo, a city ordinance required that laundries be
operated only in brick or stone buildings." 6 Almost one hundred percent of the non-
Chinese applicants who sought exemption from the requirement were allowed to
operate their laundries in wooden buildings." 7 In contrast, none of the roughly 200
Chinese applicants was given an exemption from the requirement under the ordi-
nance." '8 Yick Wo was imprisoned for violating the ordinance and challenged the
administration of the otherwise neutral law." 9 The Court could not find a legitimate
reason for the law and held that the only reason for the discrimination against the
Chinese applicants in the administration of the law was "hostility to the race and
nationality to which [they] belong, and which in the eye of the law is notjustified."120
Notably, the Rule had not been developed when Strauder and Yick Wo were de-
cided. Significantly then, the notion that prejudice, particularly racial hostility, is
illegitimate came into being under the only articulated standard of review that existed:
rational basis. More significantly, history teaches that racial discrimination, which
clearly was motivated by hostility, was "rational" in the eyes of white society for a
long time and certainly at the time of Strauder and Yick Wo. It was not long until
Plessy v. Ferguson and the separate but equal doctrine constitutionalized racial
discrimination.' 2 ' Had the analytical rule been that a rational reason for a law could
save it even though it was motivated by racial hostility, Strauder and Yick Wo pre-
sumably would have gone the other way. Accordingly, a fair reading of those cases
is that racial hostility makes a law per se unconstitutional even if a "legitimate" (at
invalid because it was based on stereotypes); Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718,
725 (1982) (holding a female-only admission policy to state nursing school invalid because
it was based on stereotypes).
"' See generally W.E.B. DuBois, THE SOULS OF BLACK FOLKS (1903) (presenting the
meaning of being black in the twentieth century); Cheryl I. Harris, The Whiteness of Property,
106 HARv. L. REv. 1709 (1993) (discussing the relationship between racial identity and
property ownership).
"1 THE NEW OxFORD DICTIONARY 823 (2d ed. 2005).
"1 118 U.S. 356, 373 (1886).
116 Id. at 368.
"7 Id. at 374.
118 Id.
119 Id.
120 Id.
121 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
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the time) reason could otherwise support it. The Strauder and Yick Wo Courts, by
exposing the unfair bias behind the laws and applying a methodology that did not
condone the bias, enhanced their integrity.
With hindsight, of course, modem society has a much deeper understanding of
racism, and most whites would never conclude that laws like those enacted under the
separate but equal doctrine are rational or motivated by anything but racial hostility.
The methodology in Strauder and Yick Wo, as exceptional as those cases were,
reflected the spirit and purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment as articulated in the
Slaughter-House Cases 22 in 1873 and as now accepted by society.
Significantly, the genesis for recognizing that ill-motivated laws are different
from other laws can be found in Justice Stone's famous footnote four.123 Recall that
he suggested that heightened scrutiny might be appropriate when laws are motivated
by prejudice against discrete and insular minorities. 124 Moreover, the logic and im-
portance of this concept, particularly in the context of racial discrimination, endures
under the now existing Rule. For example, in Loving v. Virginia, the Court struck
down Virginia's anti-miscegenation statute because it found the law was intended to
promote "White Supremacy" (which was even capitalized in the opinion) and served
no other legitimate purpose.2 5 Despite the Court's holding in Brown v. Board of
Education, denouncing racial segregation in public education and setting the stage
for the end of the separate but equal doctrine throughout society, 26 many whites clung
to out-dated negative stereotypes about blacks and other people of color that reflected
much deeper racial hostility. For many whites, their thinking about race relations
was entirely rational. The Loving Court, like the Strauder and Yick Wo Courts,
however, did not succumb to the ostensible "rationality" behind the racial hostility
that shaped the ideology of white supremacy. Instead, it implicitly applied the Ill
Motives Exception to strike down the law. 127
One might wonder, then, why the Loving Court explicitly held that strict scrutiny
was the proper standard of review to apply because the law classified on the basis of
race. 12 Further, why did the Court also hold that the statute deprived the Lovings of
their fundamental right to marry under substantive due process? 129 Because Loving
is an obvious intersection case, strict scrutiny presumptively was bound to apply
because it was a "wash" case at the highest level, just like in Korematsu.3° Perhaps
122 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873).
123 United States v. Carolene Prod. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
124 id.
125 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967).
126 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
127 See Figure 2 infra p. 745.
128 Loving, 388 U.S. at 11.
29 Id. at 12. Professor Pamela Karlan suggests Loving "marked the rebirth of substantive
due process." Pamela S. Karlan, Foreword: Loving Lawrence, 102 MICH. L. REv. 1447, 1448
(2004).
130 See supra notes 58-60 and accompanying text.
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the Court's unnecessary (as a matter of procedure) invocation of the rhetoric of strict
scrutiny, coupled with its acknowledgment that White Supremacy motivated the
law, were meant to emphasize how odious the law was, a particularly compelling
message coming from the Court in the late 1960s. Perhaps the Court felt it was a
matter of judicial integrity to acknowledge the racism behind the law and follow a
methodology that emphasized the inequality, and therefore unconstitutionality, of
the law. As a matter of judicial integrity, the Loving Court refused to participate in
and sanction the racial hostility. Certainly, the Court's invocation of strict scrutiny
and its decision to strike down the law under equal protection and due process analyses
did not violate its Principle to refrain from unnecessarily deciding constitutional
questions. It merely reiterated established law. 131 In this way, the Court's emphasis
on the hatred behind the law reinforces the idea that racial hostility itself is reason
enough to invalidate a law, although the Court has never explicitly held this.
b. From Racial Hostility to Prejudice
Many people might be surprised to learn that a law can be ill-motivated and still
possibly pass constitutional muster. The seeds for this possibility were planted in
1973 in U.S. Department ofAgriculture v. Moreno.32 In Moreno, the Court held un-
constitutional a provision of the federal food stamp program that limited assistance
to "related" persons living in the household. 33 A stated purpose of the limitation was
"to prevent so-called 'hippies' and 'hippie communes' from participating in the food
stamp program."' 34 The Court held the limitation was an unconstitutional denial of
equal protection, and its reasoning remains a central part of modem jurisprudence:
[Iff the constitutional conception of "equal protection of the laws"
means anything, it must at the very least mean that a bare...
desire to harm a politically unpopular group cannot constitute a
legitimate governmental interest. As a result, "[a] purpose to
discriminate against hippies cannot, in and of itself and without
reference to [some independent] considerations in the public
interest, justify the [law]."' 35
Interestingly, the Cleburne Court cited this quotation in Moreno and ultimately
struck down the city's denial of a special use permit for a home for persons with
'' See infra Part II.A (analyzing how shaky this holding truly was).
132 413 U.S. 528 (1973).
133 Id. at 529.
134 Id. at 534 (citing H.R. REP. No 91-1793, at 8 (1970) (Conf. Rep)).
'31 Id. at 534-35 (quoting the lower court at 345 F. Supp. 310, 314 n. 11 (D.D.C. 1974)).
In Bolling v. Sharpe, the Court held that the standards for evaluating constitutional claims
under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments are the same. 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
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"mental retardation" because "[t]he short of it is that requiring the permit in this case
appears to us to rest on an irrational prejudice against the mentally retarded."' 13 6
This is different from saying the law merely lacks a legitimate state interest and
therefore fails rational basis review under the Rule. Laws can lack legitimate state
interests under the Rule without being motivated by prejudice and therefore fall more
appropriately within the IIl Motives Exception. For example, in Allegheny Pittsburgh
Coal v. Webster County, the Court unanimously struck down a property taxing
scheme that resulted in unfair disparities in assessed property values over a period of
time.'37 The Court rejected the state's proffered justification that the scheme was
rationally related to its interest in "assessing properties at true current value."''
38
Here it is important to highlight the word "bare" in the Moreno quote.'39 The
government's "desire to harm" the hippies was not the reason for striking down the
law."4 Rather, it was the only reason for the law, which otherwise lacked a legitimate
government interest. If a legitimate interest had supported the law, then the desire to
harm the hippies would not have invalidated it. Similarly, what made the City of
Cleburne's denial of the permit unconstitutional? It was not the city officials' preju-
dice against persons with "mental retardation"; it was their lack of a legitimate state
interest in requiring the permit. Stated alternatively, under the MorenolCleburne rule,
it is possible for a law to be ill-motivated and be constitutional as long as the govern-
ment adequately justifies the law. The Ill Motives Exception does not reflect a
per se rule.
3. The Importance of the Ill Motives Exception
a. Why the Distinction Matters
So why create a separate Ill Motives Exception, especially since fitting into it does
not mean that the law is necessarily unconstitutional? In some cases, like Moreno
and Cleburne, it is irrelevant to the outcome. Still, the Moreno and Cleburne Courts'
denouncement of the irrational prejudice against hippies and persons with "mental
retardation," respectively, marked a significant difference between striking down
a law because it lacks a legitimate state interest (either under the Rule or the Logical
Exception) and placing a case within the Ill Motives Exception. Thus, a more reflec-
tive answer suggests at least four possible ways in which ajudicial acknowledgment
of ill motives, and not just illegitimacy, does matter.
'36 City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432,450 (1985) (emphasis added).
117 488 U.S. 336 (1989).
138 Id. at 343.
139 See supra text accompanying note 135.
'40 Moreno, 413 U.S. at 534.
[Vol. 16:685
WHITHER SEXUAL ORIENTATION ANALYSIS?
First, the presence and intensity of ill motives matter under equal protection.
It is disingenuous to approach equal protection analysis from the premise that the
struggle for equality for all groups is the same or meets the same resistance. How
much groups are feared or hated is directly related to how hard their struggle has
been and continues to be. The different levels of review under equal protection
rightfully reflect this by taking into consideration the history of discrimination
against a group and their concomitant political powerlessness. Even a facially
neutral law that disparately impacts members of a racial group generally will be
subject to rational basis review unless it has a discriminatory purpose, thereby
triggering heightened scrutiny.'
Lessons from the history of race discrimination cases teach us that not all ill
motives are the same, and exposing them for what they are reduces the chances that
an extreme ill motive toward a group can be masked behind a more benign sentiment
that insulates the law from a more critical analysis and also possibly misrepresents
the degree of prejudice or hostility toward a group. This happened in Cleburne. The
sentiment expressed in the Moreno quotation-"a bare ... desire to harm' 142 -
bespeaks more of hostility than of prejudice. Unfortunately, this harsher sentiment
perhaps was tempered by the fact that the targeted group in Moreno was hippies.
With all due respect to hippies, it is impossible to take seriously a suggestion that the
two groups are "identical" with respect to the ill motives society feels toward them.
If the Cleburne Court had acknowledged that the denial of the special use permit
was motivated by "a desire to harm," that is, hostility, or even a deep-seeded historical
"prejudice" different in kind from the prejudice against hippies, that might have brought
to mind cases like Strauder, Yick Wo, Korematsu, and Loving. For example, Justice
Marshall, dissenting in Cleburne, clearly saw the difference between the ill motives
of prejudice and hostility and felt more searching judicial review was called for when
hostility might have been the governing ill motive.143 He analogized the discrimination
against people with "mental retardation" to the lengthy history of the unequal treatment
of women and racial minorities.1" Justice Marshall took exception to the majority's
holding that people with "mental retardation" are not a quasi-suspect class because
he believed that heightened review was called for, just as it is with respect to classi-
fications based on sex and race, to make sure "the hostility or thoughtlessness with
which there is reason to be concerned has not carried the day."' 145
141 See, e.g., Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229,241 (1976) ("A statute, otherwise neutral
on its face, must not be applied so as invidiously to discriminate on the basis of race.").
142 Moreno, 413 U.S. at 534.
141 See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 464 (1985) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
144 Id. at 462.
145 Id. at 472. Equally troubling to Justice Marshall was the majority's holding that an
illegitimate purpose does not invalidate a law as long as some legitimate purpose supports
it. Id. at 474. He cited the Court's precedent for striking down laws that are enacted with a
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Second, acknowledging ill motives is symbolically important. Because officially
sanctioned prejudice and hostility are inconsistent with equality principles, many
people will be surprised to learn that a law can be ill-motivated and still possibly pass
constitutional muster. Ill motives strike at the heart of the very value of equal pro-
tection. Moreover, society functions on the premise that government officials carry
out their duties in good faith. In fact, their good faith generally immunizes them from
suits for money damages in the event they violate an individual's rights.' 46 It assaults
our collective sense of fairness to think that government officials can, and sometimes
do, act in their official capacities on their prejudices and hostilities toward certain
groups, and it is unacceptable to think they might get away with it. The Moreno and
Cleburne Courts' denouncement of the irrational prejudice against hippies and per-
sons with "mental retardation," respectively, did not affect the outcomes in those
cases, but it had important symbolic significance. The Court enhanced its integrity by
acknowledging the difference between irrational laws and irrational prejudice against
a group.
Third, not only is it important for government officials, including judges, who see
government prejudice and hostility to expose it, but they also cannot participate in
it. 147 Many people who harbor ill feelings or thoughts about particular groups might
not recognize or characterize their thoughts as biased because many differences among
people have been normalized. 4 8 To the extent this is true in a given situation, an
discriminatory purpose even if legitimate reasons might exist in support of them. Id. at 476
n.25 ("If a discriminatory purpose infects a legislative Act, the Act itself is inconsistent with the
Equal Protection Clause and cannot validly be applied to anyone."). In the final analysis, it
seems Justice Marshall was advocating for the Ill Motives Exception, which would have mooted
the analysis under the Rule.
"4 See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982).
147 Perhaps this was most poignantly illustrated by Shelley v. Kraemer, in which the Court
held that a court's enforcement of a private contract that promoted race discrimination consti-
tuted "state action." 334 U.S. 1, 14 (1948). By suggesting that judges cannot participate in the
denial of rights, I mean this not only in the controversial Shelley sense, but also in the larger
sense of the need for judges to maintain their integrity.
l48 Recent literature is exposing gaps in the evidence about the causal relationship, if any,
between subconscious prejudice and concomitant prejudicial behavior by individuals. See,
e.g., Gregory Mitchell & Philip E. Tetlock, Antidiscrimination Law and the Perils of
Mindreading, 67 OHIO ST. L.J. 1023 (2006). At the center of the discussion seems to be the
Implicit Association Test (IAT), designed to measure how a person thinks or feels about certain
groups without asking them explicitly. This is explained in an article by Anthony G. Greenwald
et al., Measuring Individual Differences in Implicit Cognition: The Implicit Association Test,
74 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1464, 1474 (1998). This growing debate is in response
to a body of literature that builds on the presumption that there is a causal relationship, which
began with the seminal piece by Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal
Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REv. 317 (1987). See also
Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach to
Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REv. 1161 (1995). For
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equality-minded person can unwittingly contribute to inequality dynamics. '49 Stated
alternatively, a person who has normalized differences cannot be certain to avoid
participating in the dynamics of inequality even though he or she would not con-
sciously behave in such ways. In fact, many people self-identify as equality-minded
and yet do not understand the complex dynamics of discrimination, including how
individually ingrained thought patterns and institutional biases contribute to the
inequality of some groups. 50
Naturally, from the "outsider' s" perspective, it is difficult to conclude that domi-
nant groups do not "know" on some level of consciousness that they have biased
beliefs and that those beliefs undoubtedly influence their behavior and judgment.151
At some point, equality-minded people must assume responsibility for educating
themselves about the dynamics of inequality. 152 For an equality-minded person, what
one does not know about the dynamics of inequality can hurt the person's cause. For
government leaders, including judges, what one does not know about the dynamics
can hurt society's cause-to achieve equality for everyone. 153
This possibility lurking in Cleburne might explain why the Court did not stop
its analysis with its inability to find a legitimate purpose for the permit requirement
and consequently tried to establish that the mentally retarded are not the target of
prejudice. The Court might have thought that would be so mean-spirited that itjust
could not have been the motivation of the city council members, presumably people
of goodwill, who voted three to one to deny the permit.'54 In the final analysis,
however, this conclusion was unavoidable.
compelling evidence of a causal relationship between the existence of ill motives and the ten-
dency to act on them, see PICCA & FEAGIN, supra note 29.
149 See, e.g., SHARON E. RUSH, LOVING ACROSS THE COLOR LINE: A WHrrE ADOPTIVE
MOTHER LEARNS ABOUT RACE (2002). In this book, I explore how my own lack of under-
standing about race discrimination dynamics impeded my ability to more effectively and
consciously avoid participating in the dynamics of inequality.
150 See JOER. FEAGIN ETAL., WHITE RACISM: THE BASICS (2d ed. 2001); Barbara J. Flagg,
"Was Blind, But Now I See": White Race Consciousness and the Requirement of Discrimi-
natory Intent, 91 MICH. L. REV. 953 (1993).
'.' See generally PICCA & FEAGIN, supra note 29 (documenting how whites act in non-
racist ways in public (front stage) but behave in racist ways in private (back stage), indicating
they know the difference).
152 See Sharon Elizabeth Rush, Sharing Space: Why Racial Goodwill Isn't Enough, 32
CONN. L. REV. 1 (1999).
'13 See Jon Hanson & Kathleen Hanson, The Blame Frame: Justifying (Racial) Injustice
in America, 41 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 413,480 (2006) ("Blackness, badness, violence, and
criminality are closely linked in the minds of most Americans. The easy association usually
operates outside our conscious awareness; our stereotypes and prejudices do not feel chosen.
But the effects are real, and the absence of conscious 'choice' does not imply an absence of
responsibility. Our commitment, after all, is to freedom and justice for all, not to some illusion."
(footnote omitted)),
" City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432,437 (1985).
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If an individual is truly equality-minded, he or she presumably would appreciate
learning about those dynamics in order to guard against protecting government ill
motives. Judges who uncover ill motives serve the public's best interest by exposing
them, because exposure informs the democratic process; it provides information for
the day-to-day discussions among people, and it invites more formal efforts to gain
greater understanding of the dynamics of discrimination with an eye toward elimi-
nating it. Exposure of prejudice and hostility is an enormously important first step
in a journey of a thousand miles toward equality. 155
b. From Prejudice to Political Unpopularity
Yet, the fourth reason to acknowledge the difference between a finding of
illegitimacy and invoking the Ill Motives Exception is to avoid perpetuation of the
inequality. Again, the Cleburne Court's analysis is informative of what happens when
an ill motive behind a law is down-played. Specifically, the Cleburne Court not only
shifted the focus away from the "desire to harm" language (hostility) to "prejudice,"
but it further shifted the focus to the question of whether persons with "mental retar-
dation" are a "politically unpopular group."'56 Most of the Cleburne Court's opinion
is devoted to searching for some rational reason for the permit requirement, which
would have saved it under Moreno, while simultaneously disputing its own ultimate
conclusion that people with "mental retardation" are the target of prejudice. As the
Court observed in a footnote, citing to John Ely, Dean of Stanford Law School and
former Professor at Harvard and Yale, "[s]urely one has to feel sorry for a person dis-
abled by something he or she can't do anything about, but I'm not aware of any reason
to suppose that elected officials are unusually unlikely to share that feeling."' 57
Accordingly, the Court focused on the "politically unpopular" language of
Moreno'58 and explored how people with "mental retardation" are unlikely to be the
target of prejudice because they are not politically unpopular as evidenced by the
positive body of law enacted on their behalf.'59 The Court noted that both the federal
and many state governments, including the state of Texas, had enacted laws against
disability discrimination, indicating "that the lawmakers have been addressing [the
mentally retarded's] difficulties in a manner that belies a continuing antipathy or
155 Lao-tzu, a Chinese philosopher, said, "The journey of a thousand miles begins beneath
one's feet." LAOZI, TAO TE CHING: THE BOOK OF THE WAY 458 (Moss Roberts ed. 2001).
This is popularly phrased, "The journey of a thousand miles begins with a single step." The
Quotations Page, http://www.quotationspage.com/quote/24004.html (last visited Nov. 25,
2007).
156 Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 447.
151 Id. at 442 n.10 (quoting ELY, supra note 30, at 150).
' U.S. Dep't of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973).
159 Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 442-46.
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prejudice."'6' Such legislative effort, "which could hardly have occurred and sur-
vived without public support, negates any claim that the mentally retarded are politi-
cally powerless in the sense that they have no ability to attract the attention of the
lawmakers."
161
The Cleburne Court's conception of what it means for a group to be politically
popular, as measured by legislative victories, is somewhat understandable. Favorable
legislation is evidence that a particular law is not ill-motivated. But the Court's con-
ception also is dangerously flawed. Notice the huge leap the Cleburne Court made,
extrapolating from its observation that because some anti-discrimination laws exist
to protect people with "mental retardation," that means they are not the target of
prejudice or hostility. This belies the Court's own finding in the case.
Significantly, the struggle for equal protection is not about political popularity;
it is about political power. The Cleburne Court uses both words, 62 and there is some
relationship between them. It bears emphasizing that how much a group is feared or
hated generally is related to how much or how little political power they have. But
political power is different from political popularity. Political power is about gaining
equal citizenship on an enduring basis. Sometimes people, perhaps as a matter of
principle, use their political power to support even very politically unpopular groups
that are the target of prejudice or hostility. The Americans with Disabilities Act
(ADA) provides an example.'63 Progress toward equality for politically powerless
groups necessarily relies on the goodwill, understanding, and ultimately the integrity
of the politically powerful. Sometimes this will manifest itself in the ordinary demo-
cratic process (majority wins), as it did with the ADA. Other times it must manifest
itself in decisions by politically powerful figures-like judges-who are called upon
in the democratic process to protect "constitutional values in our scheme of govern-
ment even more fundamental than perfected pluralism-most notably, those that bar
prejudice against [discrete and insular minorities]. '""
By juxtaposing "political power" against "political popularity," as the Court did
in Cleburne, the Court undermined both concepts and reduced the chances that people
with "mental retardation" would be classified as a quasi-suspect or a suspect class
even though they are politically powerless as a group, which in turn, results from the
widespread prejudice and fear of them. Recall that "political powerlessness" is a
'60 Id. at 443.
161 Id. at 445. Moreover, adding to the Court's apparent confusion, it rightfully acknowl-
edged that it can be rational to legislate in ways that account for the reality that people with
"mental retardation" have differences that lawfully can and should be taken into account.
162 Id. at 438, 447.
163 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (2000).
164 Ackerman, supra note 50, at 746. I substituted the broader category "discrete and in-
sular minorities" for "racial and religious minorities" in the spirit of Ackerman's critique of
footnote four.
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major criterion the Court uses to classify groups as suspect. 165 In turn, under the
Proper Methodology, any equal protection claims of discrimination against them
would merely have to be rational to withstand constitutional scrutiny.
c. From Cleburne to Garrett and Lane
This misguided focus highlights the importance of understanding the Proper
Methodology, because the Cleburne Court's analysis has had enormous conse-
quences twenty years later16 6 with respect to Congress's section 5 power to enact
the ADA. 167 In Board of Trustees of the University ofAlabama v. Garrett, the Court
held that state employees are barred by the Eleventh Amendment from seeking
money damages against the state for alleged violations of Title I of the ADA, which
prohibits discrimination against persons with disabilities in employment.168 Patricia
Garrett was effectively demoted from the position of Director of Nursing at the
University of Alabama upon her return to work following treatment for cancer. 169
Only four years later, in Tennessee v. Lane, the Court upheld the right of private liti-
gants to sue the state for money damages for violations of Title II of the ADA, which
prohibits discrimination against persons with disabilities in "the provision or oper-
ation of public services, programs, or activities."' 7° George Lane and Beverly Jones,
paraplegics, alleged they were unable to attend court hearings because the courthouse
facilities were not handicap accessible.' 7
It is worth examining what the Garrett and Lane Courts extracted from the rea-
soning in Cleburne about the importance of finding that a group faces widespread
discrimination. First and foremost, supporting the need for the ADA was an extensive
165 See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973).
166 This time span brings to mind Justice O'Connor's admonishment in Grutterv. Bollinger,
that the need to take race into account in public school admissions should be unnecessary
twenty-five years hence. 539 U.S. 306, 343 (2003). If such was not the case in the disability
context, there is reason to be skeptical that it will be any different in the race or sexual orien-
tation contexts.
167 See generally Ruth Colker, The Section Five Quagmire, 47 UCLA L. REv. 653 (2000)
(providing an excellent discussion of the scope of Congress's section 5 power with respect
to disability discrimination).
168 531 U.S. 356, 360 (2001).
169 Id. at 362.
170 541 U.S. 509, 517 (2004).
171 Id. at 513. Both cases addressed the scope of Congress's section 5 enforcement power
under the Fourteenth Amendment; their holdings turned on answers to the question of whether
the provisions of the ADA intended to abrogate state immunity were "congruent and propor-
tional" to the injuries suffered due to alleged disability discrimination. Lane, 541 U.S. at 531;
Garrett, 531 U.S. at 374. The intricacies surrounding abrogation are beyond the purpose of
this Article, but the cases inform the analysis and emphasize why it is critical to understand how
the Rule and the Exceptions function.
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congressional record compiled after decades of investigation, including congressional
hearings and the establishment of a special task force.' The Court in both cases
cited favorably to the report, in which Congress concluded that "disabled" persons
face widespread discrimination.
The Garrett Court:
Congress made a general finding in the ADA that "historically,
society has tended to isolate and segregate individuals with dis-
abilities, and, despite some improvements, such forms of dis-
crimination against individuals with disabilities continue to be
a serious and pervasive social problem." The record assembled
by Congress includes many instances to support such a finding.
But the great majority of these incidents do not deal with the
activities of States.
173
The Lane Court:
[I]ndividuals with disabilities are a discrete and insular minority
who have been faced with restrictions and limitations, subjected
to a history of purposeful unequal treatment, and relegated to a
position of political powerlessness in our society, based on char-
acteristics that are beyond the control of such individuals and
resulting from stereotypic assumptions not truly indicative of
the individual ability of such individuals to participate in, and
contribute to, society.174
Unlike the Cleburne Court, neither the Garrett nor the Lane Courts accepted the
premise that the existence of the ADA evidenced the absence of discrimination against
persons with disabilities. 175 In fact, and this is far more logical, the existence of the
172 See Lane, 541 U.S. at 516.
17' Garrett, 531 U.S. at 369 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(2) (2000)).
174 Lane, 541 U.S. at 516 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(7) (2000)).
"' Given the congressional findings and the Court's acknowledgment of them, why did
the Court rule against Garrett under Title I and for Lane under Title II? Significantly, the dif-
ferent outcomes did not result from a finding that the disabled are not discriminated against.
Rather, in Garrett, the record failed to persuade the Court that there was a history and pattern
of discrimination by the state against disabled persons in employment, and therefore, Title I of
the ADA failed the "congruent and proportional" test. Garrett, 531 U.S. at 374. In contrast, the
Lane Court upheld Title II because it was persuaded that the "congruent and proportional"
standard was met with respect to discrimination against the disabled in public services, pro-
grams, and activities. Lane, 541 U.S. at 531. It is interesting that Congress and the Court found
little prejudice by the state against the disabled in public employment, but they found it bor-
dered on hostility toward them in public services. Moreover, as the Court noted, it is easier
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ADA is an acknowledgment that persons with disabilities need to be protected from
discrimination.
Garrett and Lane highlight several important points about the role of ill motives
in constitutional analysis. Both Courts struggled with the question of how widespread
the discrimination is against people with disabilities. The discussions focused, to a
large extent, on the existence of ill motives by state actors across the country. This
is different from searching for a legitimate reason for a law, although that inquiry
also is relevant under Cleburne/Moreno. For example, the Garrett Court emphasized
that even if there were prejudice against the disabled, that would not invalidate the law
as long as there was a rational reason to support it.'76 Quoting the Court, "[a]lthough
such biases may often accompany irrational (and therefore unconstitutional) discrimi-
nation, their presence alone does not a constitutional violation make."' 7 7 The Lane
Court got much closer to the "hostility" line in its analysis of the history of discrimi-
nation against the disabled in public services.78 It even relied on some of Justice
Marshall's observations in his dissenting opinion in Cleburne.'79
Justice Kennedy's concurrence in Garrett, joined by Justice O'Connor,"80
deserves special attention because it confirms that a finding of "hostility" toward
the disabled is less likely to be acknowledged by the Court, even if it exists, because
discrimination under equal protection generally is perceived as merely a matter of
prejudice.' 8' Justice Kennedy's language must be highlighted because it is so telling
on this point:
Prejudice, we are beginning to understand, rises not from malice
or hostile animus alone. It may result as well from insensitivity
caused by simple want of careful, rational reflection or from some
instinctive mechanism to guard against people who appear to be
different in some respects from ourselves. Quite apart from any
for Congress to meet the "congruent and proportional" standard in abrogation cases where
the Rule is answered positively thereby necessitating heightened review. Garrett, 531 U.S.
at 365, 368. This acknowledgment that the Court would require less in the record if a quasi-
suspect class was targeted by the law came in Nevada Department of Human Resources v.
Hibbs. 538 U.S. 721 (2003) (upholding the Family Medical Leave Act as a valid abrogation
of state's immunity). In Lane, the fundamental right of access to the courts was in play. Lane,
541 U.S. at 538 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
176 Garrett, 531 U.S. at 367.
177 Id. The Court then quoted from Cleburne, "mere negative attitudes, or fear, unsub-
stantiated by factors which are properly cognizable in a zoning proceeding, are not per-
missible bases for treating a home for the mentally retarded differently." Id. (quoting City of
Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 448 (1985)).
17' Lane, 541 U.S. at 524 n.5.
179 id.
1' But Justice O'Connor in Lawrence suggests that law is born of animus. Lawrence v.
Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 583 (2003) (O'Connor, J., concurring); see infra Part II.B.4.
18 Garrett, 531 U.S. at 374-76 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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historical documentation, knowledge of our own human instincts
teaches that persons who find it difficult to perform routine func-
tions by reason of some mental or physical impairment might at
first seem unsettling to us, unless we are guided by the better
angels of our nature. There can be little doubt, then, that persons
with mental or physical impairments are confronted with preju-
dice which can stem from indifference or insecurity as well as
from malicious ill will. 1
82
Justice Kennedy acknowledges that some people harbor no ill will toward particular
groups; they just do not care about them, or they feel insecure around them. While
this might accurately reflect the sentiments of some people, it also is true that studies
support findings that many people harbor ill will toward particular groups without
being fully aware of their feelings because differences among people often have been
normalized throughout society. This is the predominant message in Justice Kennedy's
quote. Factoring in the possibility that state actors, including judges, might make
decisions that are rooted in the normalization of differences can be quite important.
For example, the distinction between indifference and insecurity on the one hand and
malice on the other, is irrelevant in Garrett, unless Justice Kennedy is suggesting,
as he seems to be, that malice (hostility), as opposed to mere prejudice, ups the judicial
review ante.'83 This notwithstanding, Justice Kennedy was unwilling to attribute
"misconceived or malicious perceptions of some of [the state's] citizens" to the state
itself. 4 Like the majority, he focused only on the level of involvement of the state
qua state in employment discrimination cases and not on that of private citizens and
state actors more generally.' 85
Thus, even though anti-discrimination laws occasionally respond favorably to
a group, the group nevertheless can continue to be the target of discrimination and
also remain largely politically powerless. For example, notwithstanding many pieces
of progressive legislation, the struggle for racial equality illustrates how long and
enduring the journey is. Anti-discrimination laws cannot and should not be evi-
dence, in and of themselves, that the targeted groups are "politically popular," let
alone politically powerful. Such victories certainly should not be taken as evidence
that targeted groups are no longer the victims of official ill motives. The dynamics
of discrimination are far more complex than reflected in Cleburne's analysis.
182 id. at 374-75.
183 Because the case would fall into the Ill Motives Exception, heightened scrutiny would
not be called for. Justice Kennedy arguably adopts the rationale consistent with the Ill Motives
Exception. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 632 (1996) ("[The Amendment's] sheer breadth
is so discontinuous with the reasons offered for it that the amendment seems inexplicable by
anything but animus toward the class it affects; it lacks a rational relationship to legitimate state
interests.").
'8 Garrett, 531 U.S. at 375.
185 See id.
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d. From Cleburne to Romer
The red flags raised by the Court's analysis in Cleburne also surface in the
context of sexual orientation discrimination as an examination of Romer v. Evans
illustrates. 186 In Romer, the voters of Colorado amended their Constitution to pro-
hibit the enactment of laws that provided "protected status based on homosexual,
lesbian, or bisexual orientation. "187 The Court held that Amendment 2, as it is more
commonly known, "withdraws from homosexuals, but no others, specific legal pro-
tection from the injuries caused by discrimination, and it forbids reinstatement of
these laws and policies."' 88 "[L]aws of the kind now before us raise the inevitable
inference that the disadvantage imposed is born of animosity toward the class of
persons affected." 189 "Animus" means "hostility or ill feeling."' 90
The Court's invocation of the word animus is quite remarkable; according to
my research, it is the only time the Court has used that word to invalidate a law under
equal protection. Thus, is Romer the case that announces that animus makes a law
per se unconstitutional and thereby makes the Ill Motives Exception "officially" sanc-
tioned by the Court? Unfortunately, it does not. Immediately after using the word
"animus," the Court cites to Moreno's "bare... desire to harm" language and then
evaluates the state's proffered justifications for the law before rejecting them as ille-
gitimate.' 91 This puts Romer squarely within Moreno and Cleburne. Amendment 2 was
struck down, not because it was motivated by animus, but because no other legitimate
purpose could justify it.
Accordingly, because Amendment 2 failed rational basis review, consistent with
the Principle, the Court did not need to answer whether a fundamental right or sus-
pect class was involved in the case. It is treated by the Court as a Logical Exception
case.1 92 In fact, the Court explicitly decided to avoid the fundamental rights question
even though the state court applied strict scrutiny, because it held the fundamental
right to participate in the political process was violated. '9
Significantly, this Article puts Romer squarely in the Ill Motives Exception.
Notice how the Court treated animus as if it were analytically just like prejudice to-
ward hippies and persons with "mental retardation." Significantly, the discrimination
in all three cases was irrational, and so the Court was correct to equate them on that
186 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
187 Id. at 624.
188 Id. at 627.
189 Id. at 634.
190 THE NEW OXFORD AMERICAN DICTIONARY 61 (2d ed. 2005).
191 Romer, 517 U.S. at 634-35. The state argued it had legitimate interests in protecting
citizens' freedom of association and conserving resources to fight other discrimination cases.
Id. at 635.
192 See Figure 2 infra p. 745.
'9 Romer, 517 U.S. at 625-26.
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note. But animosity is different in quality from prejudice. Generally, people do not
"hate" hippies or persons with "mental disabilities." But many people, including
government officials, do express hateful sentiments toward gays. Members of the
Court have expressed their contempt for gays. For example, Chief Justice Burger
concurred in Bowers, choosing a quote from Blackstone to articulate his position:
"Blackstone described 'the infamous crime against nature' as an offense of 'deeper
malignity' than rape, an heinous act 'the very mention of which is a disgrace to human
nature,' and 'a crime not fit to be named."'194 According to Chief Justice Burger,
consenting adults of the same sex engaging in sodomy are more disgraceful and vile
than is a rapist, that is, a violent misogynist.'95 Still, it is worth emphasizing that
under Cleburne and Moreno, animus would not have invalidated Amendment 2 if
a legitimate reason had justified it.
i. Justice Scalia's Dissent
Given the difficulty persons with disabilities have had and continue to have to
overcome discrimination, as illustrated by Cleburne, Garrett, and Lane, it is not sur-
prising that gays also have struggled to overcome discrimination. Justice Scalia's
dissent in Romer, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Thomas, is important
to explore because it probably resonates with many equality-minded people who
nevertheless harbor unreflective animosity toward gays. Justice Scalia's opinion
is a classic representation of how homophobia, the product of the normalization of
heterosexuality, 196 functions to promote inequality in the name of equality, because
he rants and raves about the immorality of homosexuality and simultaneously reiterates
the "moral" principle "that one should not hate any human being or class of human
beings."' 97 Moreover, his dissent falters on the same issues that surfaced with the
Cleburne Court: animosity and political popularity.
ii. On Animosity
Quite telling about Justice Scalia' s contempt for gays is his bottom line, announced
at the beginning of his dissenting opinion: "This Court has no business imposing
upon all Americans the resolution favored by the elite class from which the Members
" Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 197 (1986) (Burger, C.J., concurring) (quoting
WILIAM BLACKSTONE, 4 COMMENTARIES *215); see Anne B. Goldstein, Comment, History,
Homosexuality, and Political Values: Searching for the Hidden Determinants of Bowers v.
Hardwick, 97 YALE L.J. 1073 (1988).
9 Bowers, 478 U.S. at 197.
196 See generally Carbado, supra note 31 (discussing the normalization of heterosexuality
and it's marginalization of other identities).
197 Romer, 517 U.S. at 644 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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of this institution are selected, pronouncing that 'animosity' toward homosexuality
is evil. I vigorously dissent. '" 8
The lead-in phrase reads like an entirely legitimate criticism of the Romer majority
and one that is often leveled at the Court. That is, the Court is an anti-majoritarian
institution, and it lacks the power to impose its values on a majority of the people who
do not feel the same way as the Justices.
The second phrase, however, is a startling observation, particularly emanating
from a Supreme Court Justice. Is he saying that voters have the democratic authority
to enact a discriminatory law-a constitutional amendment even-that is borne of
animosity toward homosexuality (gays) and is otherwise unjustifiable? Later in his
dissent, he affirms that "Coloradans are.., entitled to be hostile toward homosexual
conduct."' 199 At one point, Justice Scalia even suggests that animosity toward homo-
sexuality is an "all-American" sentiment: "The Court's opinion contains grim, dis-
approving hints that Coloradans have been guilty of 'animus' or 'animosity' toward
homosexuality, as though that has been established as un-American."" °
Justice Scalia is careful to distinguish homosexuality from homosexuals, of
course. Phrased more popularly, Justice Scalia espouses the view that one should
love the sinner and hate the sin. Some equality-minded people adopt this viewpoint,
perhaps because they do not fully understand how inextricably intertwined sexual
orientation is with a person's expression of his or her sexuality. On reflection, most
heterosexuals see this point quite clearly with respect to their own choice of intimate
partners but seem unable to grasp this concept with respect to gays, because it is diffi-
cult for many heterosexuals to break out of the thought pattern that normalizes hetero-
sexuality and leaves them to confront their own homophobia. The status/conduct
distinction ostensibly resolves the dissonance, which is the approach Justice Scalia
takes in his dissent. Because it is homosexuality and not homosexuals that the voters
of Colorado condemn, they can remain equality-minded people."0
However, Justice Scalia's opinion adds a dangerous twist that should give all
equality-minded people pause. He tries to mask the voters' animosity toward gays-
the sole motivation behind Amendment 2-by focusing on the democratic principle
that people have a right to condemn homosexuality. It is hard to disagree with this.
198 Id. at 636 (emphasis added).
'99 Id. at 644.
200 Id.
201 Understandably, people who self-identify as equality-minded resent suggestions that
they are prejudiced or biased. One area where this is dramatically illustrated is in the area of
race relations. It is unthinkable for whites who are equality-minded that they could be con-
sidered racist. One way to ensure they can never fall into that category is to define racism in
dramatic ways to include slave owners, lynchers, or white supremacists, for example. If racism
is narrowly defined, then someone who believes in stereotypes about people of color cannot
be racist. This resolves the dissonance for the equality-minded person. The psychology of this
is artfully explained in Hanson & Hanson, supra note 153.
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People have a right to condemn any behavior. But passing a constitutional amend-
ment to sanction discrimination against gays-at every level of government-is very
different from condemning homosexuality.
Moreover, and significantly, the more socially heinous the behavior, the greater
the contempt one usually has for it. For many people, the level of contempt for the
behavior correlates to some degree with the level of prejudice or hostility they feel
toward the people who engage in the behavior. The intensity of their feelings, in turn,
also motivates them to enact laws burdening the people who are the target of their
unpleasant feelings. My point here is that it is disingenuous to pretend that how a
person judges a behavior is wholly unrelated to how that person judges people who
engage in the behavior.
This is an especially unfair and unrealistic dichotomy to impose on "identity"
characteristics-that is, race, gender, and sexual orientation, to list a few-that form
part of a person's identity. Enactment of Amendment 2 illustrates this; it was tar-
geted at gays, not at homosexuality, and sanctioned discrimination against them at
every level of government.2 °2 Imagine any other group (from murderers to hippies to
chocolate lovers to heterosexuals) being the target of Amendment 2 and the ani-
mosity toward the people, not their choices to engage in certain conduct, is crystal
clear. Once pierced, the import behind Justice Scalia's dissent leads to this con-
clusion. From his view, not only is animosity toward homosexuality (gays) not the
basis for finding a law per se unconstitutional, but it is the basis for finding it per
se constitutional. This evidences a severe hostility toward gays, yet it is all couched
in the appeal to "democratic theory." This sleight-of-hand is difficult to catch, but it
must be exposed.
Consistent with Moreno and Cleburne, a bare desire to harm a particular group
is unconstitutional. Beyond Moreno and Cleburne, a law motivated by animosity-an
extreme ill motive-should be per se unconstitutional. This Article places such a case
in the Ill Motives Exception.20 3
iii. On Political Unpopularity/Power
Second, and also supporting the first point, Justice Scalia's opinion rejects as
"preposterous" the idea that gays are a politically unpopular group and concludes that
they "enjoy[] enormous influence in American media and politics. 204 Notice the
subtle but powerful equating of "political popularity" with "political power," the same
mistake the Cleburne Court made.0 5 Justice Scalia diligently notes that "those who
engage in homosexual conduct tend to reside in disproportionate numbers in certain
202 See Romer, 517 U.S. at 624 (majority opinion).
203 See Figure 2 infra p. 745.
204 Romer, 517 U.S. at 652 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
205 See supra Part I.C.3.b.
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communities, have high disposable income.... [and] possess political power much
greater than their numbers, both locally and statewide."'2 6 Voters in Aspen, Boulder,
and Denver had enacted favorable legislation prohibiting discrimination based on
sexual orientation.0 7 Justice Scalia draws on this last observation tojustify enactment
of Amendment 2, stating that "[it sought to counter both the geographic concentration
and the disproportionate political power of homosexuals. 2 °8
Justice Scalia' s observations raise interesting and unanswered questions that need
to be examined. Central among them is the question about how political power is to
be measured.2 °9 Certainly, both the Cleburne Court and Justice Scalia are correct to
think that political popularity and political power are related. Recall that the Cleburne
Court in 1985 opined that the passage of some favorable legislation was evidence
that persons with mental disabilities were not politically unpopular-even though the
zoning permit denial in that case was based on irrational prejudice. 210 And twenty
years later the Court struggled with the same issue in the context of Congress's
section 5 enforcement power under the ADA in Garrett and Lane, in which the Court
cited with approval Congress's findings that persons with disabilities do face wide-
spread discrimination.211 Similarly, the fact that voters in several Colorado cities
passed favorable legislation on behalf of gays should not be taken as evidence per se
of gays' political power or popularity. If anything, the logical conclusion in Romer
is that any popularity or power gays might have enjoyed in limited geographical areas
was trumped by the politically powerful voters throughout the state because of ani-
mosity. It seems disingenuous to insist, as Justice Scalia does, that gays are politically
popular and powerful in some kind of absolute way, meaning they can protect them-
selves from discrimination in the ordinary democratic process, when their modest
geographical victories in a few cities in Colorado were quashed with a vengeance
merely by expanding the geographical scope of the voter base.
Such a narrow focus or definition of "political power" allows the forest to get lost
among the trees. It certainly diminishes the significance and importance of acknowl-
edging the political reality of the widespread animosity toward gays.2"2 Indeed, one
logically could conclude that passage of the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA),213
206 Romer, 517 U.S. at 645-46 (citing the Record, Exh. MMM, and affidavit of Prof.
James Hunter).
207 Id. at 646.
208 Id.
209 Gary J. Simson, Beyond Interstate Recognition in the Same-Sex Marriage Debate, 40
U.C. DAvis L. REv. 313, 371 (2006) (making this observation and illustrating the complexity
in this analysis by noting the lobbying power of physicians).
210 See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
211 See Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509 (2004); Alabama v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001).
212 Ackerman, supra note 50, passim.
213 See Pub. L. No. 104-199; 110 Stat. 2419 (1996) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2000)).
The Act provides that states are not required to give "full faith and credit" to marriages entered
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defining marriage as between a man and a woman, and the efforts of many states to
pass laws limiting marriage to a man and a woman,214 are the ultimate evidence of
just how politically powerless gays are throughout the country.
To summarize thus far, and looking at the attached Figures, the Rule requires
courts to apply heightened review in cases where either a fundamental right or a sus-
pect class is involved, and it requires them to apply rational basis review if neither
is involved.215 Following the Proper Methodology, courts deviate from the Rule when
an Exception applies. The Logical Exception applies when heightened review nor-
mally would apply because the case involves an established fundamental right or an
acknowledged suspect class (an obvious case), or because heightened review might
theoretically apply in a case where the fundamental rights question and the equal
protection question are unanswered (non-obvious cases). Logically, it is unnecessary
to apply heightened review in such cases because the laws cannot pass rational basis
review. Lawrence, Romer, and Skinner all could be Logical Exceptions cases.216 The
Ill Motives Exception applies in cases where there is no other justification for the
law, the Moreno/Cleburne standard, thus causing it to fail rational basis review even
if heightened review might normally apply. This Article suggests the Ill Motives
Exception is independently important and should make a law per se unconstitutional.
This position is especially compelling in cases where the ill motives are extreme, like
hostility or animus. Yick Wo, Strauder, Loving, Korematsu, Skinner, Lawrence, and
Romer fit within this understanding of the Exception.1 7
II. CRITICAL CHOICES: DUE PROCESS AND/OR EQUAL PROTECTION?
One of the toughest analytical challenges for a court in a non-obvious intersection
case, then, is to figure out whether its decision will rest on due process and/or equal
protection. It does matter which path the Court chooses to follow in intersection
cases, although there seem to be no clear guidelines for predicting which path a court
should follow in the first instance. If it heads down the due process route and finds
a new fundamental right that presumptively applies to everyone, then the equal pro-
tection question becomes superfluous because heightened review generally would
into by persons of the same sex in another state. 28 U.S.C. § 1738C. The word "marriage" is
defined to include one man and one woman. 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2000). For an excellent analysis of
Lawrence's effect on DOMA, see Mark D. Rosen, Why the Defense of Marriage Act Is Not
(Yet?) Unconstitutional: Lawrence, Full Faith and Credit, and the Many SocietalActors that
Determine What the Constitution Requires, 90 MINN. L. REv. 915 (2006).
214 See, e.g., Alabama Marriage Protection Act, ALA. CODE § 30-1-19 (1975); Marriages
Between Persons of the Same Sex, FLA. STAT. § 741.212 (2005); Prohibited Marriages, 750
ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/212 (1993). See generally Strasser, supra note 1 (discussing state consti-
tutional amendments limiting the definition of marriage).
215 See Figure 1 infra p. 744.
216 See Figure 2 infra p. 745.
217 See Figure 2 infra p. 745.
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apply (absent an Exception). The Court would have little, if any, incentive under the
Principle to decide the unnecessary question of the group's equal protection status,
218
which would have to wait for an answer in another case, leaving members of the
group vulnerable to possible discrimination under other laws.
Conversely, if a court asks the equal protection question first and finds the
targeted group is entitled to heightened protection, then the court need not ask the
fundamental rights question. For example, suppose the Court were to decide that laws
that classify on the basis of sexual orientation are suspect. Significantly, unlike the
situation where a case is decided on substantive due process, classifying a group as
suspect under equal protection maximizes the group's protection, because the state's
burden ofjustification would be at its highest. Naturally, this does not mean that laws
could not meet the higher burden.
Importantly, placing a decision on equal protection is less intrusive on state sov-
ereignty. In those cases, where the Court has not placed a right into the fundamental
rights sphere, states have greater leeway to regulate the right because rational basis
review applies. Such regulation, however, would be subject to equal protection stan-
dards and would have to meet a higher burden of justification if the law targeted a
suspect class.
A. Lessons from Skinner, Loving, and Zablocki
The "right to marry" cases2 '9 highlight some of the challenges and concomitant
confusion that can result from analyzing intersection cases. I begin by focusing on
Skinner, which might be surprising because generally it is not thought of as a "right
to mary" case. Recall that the Skinner Court announced in the same breath that
"marriage and procreation" are fundamental rights, but the case involved only the
question of procreation.22 Moreover, under the Principle, it was unnecessary for the
Court to hold that procreation is a fundamental right because the law that mandated
the sterilization of repeated larcenists but not embezzlers failed rational basis re-
view.22" ' In the context of this Article, the law falls into the Logical Exception, and
perhaps even the Ill Motives Exception,222 but of course, this terminology would
218 An exception would be if the Court finds that the fundamental right is subject to inter-
mediate scrutiny but an equal protection analysis would require to strict scrutiny. For example,
a law that prohibited women of a particular race from getting an abortion would have to meet
strict scrutiny.
219 In Meyer v. Nebraska, the Court articulated for the first time that aspects of family
autonomy, including the right to marry, are within the meaning of "liberty" in the due process
clause. 262 U.S. 390 (1923). However, Meyer generally is not held out as the case that estab-
lished that marriage is a fundamental right.
220 Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
221 See id.
222 See Figure 2 infra p. 745. Professor Tribe suggests that the Court applied strict scrutiny
to avoid the inequality between treating blue-collar criminals (larcenists) and white-collar
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have made no sense at the time of Skinner because Skinner was instrumental in the
establishment of the Rule itself.223 Realize this observation does not mean that pro-
creation should not be a fundamental right. It merely means that part of the Skinner
decision was unnecessary to the result. In light of this, the Court's decision to throw
marriage into the fundamental rights pot was entirely gratuitous.
Accordingly, and rightfully so, Skinner generally is not cited as the case that de-
cided that marriage is a fundamental right. Oddly, this distinction typically goes to
two cases-Loving and Zablocki-as if they both are required to establish the point.
I suggest this pairing of Loving and Zablocki illustrates why a court's choice to analyze
an intersection case under due process and/or equal protection is important and can
have far-reaching implications.
Return to the anti-miscegenation statute in Loving, which this Article places in the
Il Motives Exception because the Court held the law's only purpose was to support
White Supremacy.224 The Court held that the law was a racial classification subject
to the most rigid scrutiny under equal protection, which it failed.225 But the Court
also held, relying on a broad reading of Skinner, that the law violated the Lovings'
substantive due process rights to choose each other as marriage partners.226 Perhaps
because this part of the opinion clearly was superfluous to the Loving Court's ulti-
mate conclusion, it would take a more clearly substantive due process case to firmly
establish that the choice of a marriage partner is a fundamental right. Zablocki seems
to be that place holder.
Recall that in Zablocki a Wisconsin state law required that any resident respon-
sible for supporting a child not in his or her custody first get permission from the court
before marrying.227 Zablocki appears to be an obvious case under the Rule: the funda-
mental right to marry is involved so apply heightened scrutiny.228 In fact, it looked
awfully similar to the situation in Skinner where there also was a fundamental right
(procreation) and a non-suspect class (criminals).229 Moreover, Loving was also pre-
cedent. Under the Rule, which was implicitly invoked in Skinner and applied with
emphasis in Loving, the Zablocki Court correctly applied heightened scrutiny and
struck down the law. Today, of course, Zablocki is an obvious intersection case, but
it also is cited as the case that really held that marriage is a fundamental right.23° In
criminals (embezzlers) in ways that reflected a fear that sterilization laws might be used in
genocidal ways by the political majority against the political minority. See TRIBE, supra note
50, at 1464.
223 See Figure 1 infra p. 744.
214 See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
225 Id. at 11.
226 Id. at 12.
227 Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 375 (1978).
228 See Figure 1 infra p. 744.
229 See Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
230 See, e.g., Smelt v. County of Orange, 447 F.3d 673, 680 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 127
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this way, Zablocki was a non-obvious case or at least a less-obvious case-even
though Skinner and Loving had already held as much, albeit unnecessarily.
Zablocki illustrates some of the analytical challenges involved in intersection
cases, because its analysis merely compounded any confusion stemming from its
relationship to Skinner and Loving. Importantly, the Zablocki Court evaluated the
law explicitly under equal protection.23' Theoretically, if the case truly were only
an equal protection case, rational basis review would have applied because wealth
is not a suspect classification.232 This was the position taken by Justice Rehnquist in
his dissenting opinion.233 Moreover, under rational basis review, the law might have
been upheld, although Justices Stewart"' and Stevens thought it was irrational, par-
235ticularly as applied to indigents.
Assuming the law could have passed rational basis review under equal protection,
the Rule would have required the Court to analyze the interest at stake to determine
if it was important enough to trigger heightened scrutiny. Unlike the Skinner Court,
which held that the sterilization law was irrational236-which should have ended the
analysis-the Zablocki Court was correct to ask the fundamental rights question. The
Zablocki Court, citing to Loving, emphasized that marriage is a fundamental right
under the Fourteenth Amendment. 237 Accordingly, the Court "critically" '238 scrutinized
the law and held it unconstitutional. Strangely though, the Court placed its holding
on equal protection and not due process even though the due process analysis drove
the decision.
This misplaced rationale upset Justice Stewart and caused him to concur in
Zablocki. He believed it was important for the Court to get the difference between
equal protection and substantive due process correct. He articulated his concern:
To hold.., that the [state law] violates the Equal Protection Clause
seems to me to misconceive the meaning of that constitutional
guarantee. The Equal Protection Clause deals not with substantive
S.Ct. 396 (2006); Alma Soc. Inc. v. Mellon, 601 F.2d 1225, 1232 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 444
U.S. 995 (1979).
231 See Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 383.
232 See Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970) (holding that rational basis review
applies to welfare legislation); see also San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S.
1 (1973) (holding that poverty is not a suspect classification).
233 Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 407 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Justice Rehnquist also would have
applied rational basis review under due process. Id.
234 Id. at 394 (Stewart, J., concurring) (holding that the law was irrational as applied to the
indigent).
235 Id. at 406 (Stevens, J., concurring).
236 See Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
237 See Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 383-84 (majority opinion).
238 Id. at 383. It is not clear whether the Court applied intermediate or strict scrutiny, but it
was heightened review.
[Vol. 16:685
WHITHER SEXUAL ORIENTATION ANALYSIS?
rights or freedoms but with invidiously discriminatory classifi-
cations. . . . I think that the [state law] is unconstitutional
because it exceeds the bounds of permissible state regulation of
marriage, and invades the sphere of liberty protected by the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.239
The Court is understandably reluctant to rely on substantive due
process. But to embrace the essence of that doctrine under the
guise of equal protection serves no purpose but obfuscation.24
But what is there to obfuscate? The Rule requires that heightened scrutiny apply if
either a fundamental right or a suspect class is burdened by the underlying law, and
the Court correctly applied heightened review. But this is precisely why it is im-
portant to understand that the question of whether there is a fundamental right or a
suspect class drives the "level-of-review" analysis and not the other way around.
As it turns out, Justice Stewart was concerned that deciding the case under equal
protection--even if only nominally-apparently
shifts the focus of the judicial inquiry away from its proper
concerns, which include, "the nature of the individual interest
affected, the extent to which it is affected, the rationality of the
connection between legislative means and purpose, the exis-
tence of alternative means for effectuating the purpose, and the
degree of confidence we may have that the statute reflects the
legislative concern for the purpose that would legitimately support
the means chosen., 241
Justice Stewart' s point seems somewhat misplaced with respect to the Court's actual
analysis in Zablocki, which did focus on the underlying right: the right to marry.
However, a possible key to understanding Justice Stewart's objection is to understand
that he "[did] not agree with the Court that there is a 'right to marry' in the constitu-
tional sense. That right, or more accurately that privilege is under our federal system
peculiarly one to be defined and limited by state law. 242 But Justice Stewart also
emphasized that the Court had held in prior cases (citing to Loving and Skinner,
239 Id. at 391-92 (Stewart, J., concurring). Justice Stewart went on to state that he did not
think the "right to marry" was in the Constitution but recognized that it is part of a liberty
protected by the Due Process Clause. Id. at 392.
240 Id. at 395-96 (citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 167-68 (1973) (Stewart, J.,
concurring)).
24 Id. at 396 (quoting Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235, 260 (1970) (Harlan, J.,
concurring)).
242 Id. at 392 (footnote omitted).
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among others) that the "freedom of personal choice in matters of marriage and family
life" ' is protected by the Due Process Clause, and he "conceded" that the Wisconsin
state law "invaded" that protected sphere.2" Given Justice Stewart's concession,
the Proper Methodology puts the analysis under the Rule, heightened review still
would have applied, and the outcome would have been the same.
Legitimately, then, one might wonder what Justice Stewart's real objection was
to the Court's ostensible placement of the decision on equal protection grounds.
Another hint comes later in his concurrence:
To conceal this appropriate inquiry [whether a case involves
equal protection or due process] invites mechanical or thought-
less application of misfocused doctrine. To bring it into the open
forces a healthy and responsible recognition of the nature and
purpose of the extreme power we wield when, in invalidating a
state law in the name of the Constitution, we invalidate pro tanto
the process of representative democracy in one of the sovereign
States of the Union.245
The Court's focus on equal protection, in his view, distracted from the substantive due
process analysis. Perhaps, and obviously this is speculation, Justice Stewart thought
that if the Court had focused explicitly on substantive due process, the majority
would have paid closer attention to the "nature of the individual interest affected"
by the law and, by implication, thereby would have avoided finding a fundamental
right to marry. At a minimum, he seemed to think that placing a substantive due
process decision on substantive due process grounds was important, because that
rationale, more than equal protection, threatens state sovereignty and needs to be
exposed for what it is. From this view, Justice Stewart wanted to protect the Court's
integrity by ensuring that it followed the Proper Methodology.
Justice Powell's concurrence offered some insights on this point:
Thus, it is fair to say that there is a right of marital and familial
privacy which places some substantive limits on the regulatory
power of government. But the Court has yet to hold that all regu-
lation touching upon marriage implicates a "fundamental right"
triggering the most exacting judicial scrutiny.2"
243 Id. at 393.
244 Id. at 392.
245 Id. at 396.
246 Id. at 397 (Powell, J., concurring).
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Moreover, Justice Powell explicitly, and I believe correctly, identified Loving as an
equal protection case.247 As such, "[Loving] does not speak to the level of judicial
scrutiny of, or governmental justification for, 'supportable' restrictions on the
'fundamental freedom' of individuals to marry or divorce." 24 8 He highlights several
state-imposed restrictions on marriage, including bans on homosexuality, and con-
cludes that "[a] 'compelling state purpose' inquiry would cast doubt on the network
of restrictions that the States have fashioned to govern marriage and divorce. '249 But
even if marriage was not a fundamental right, when equal protection methodology
calls for heightened review to ensure a marriage regulation does not unjustifiably dis-
criminate, courts presumably would apply that higher standard (absent an Exception).
It would be a matter of judicial integrity to follow the Proper Methodology.
This last observation is both good and bad news, depending on whether one
supports or opposes marriage between partners of the same sex. On the one hand,
Justice Powell suggests that a ban could not pass strict scrutiny. On the other hand,
he suggests that it could pass rational basis review and that is all that would be re-
quired.2 1' But under the Proper Methodology, even if marriage fell out of protected
status as a fundamental right, equal protection would still be in place to protect
people from marriage restrictions that unfairly discriminate.
How much weight should be given to Justices Stewart's and Powell's concerns,
then, about whether marriage should be a fundamental right? Notably, a close reading
of Zablocki leaves some doubt about the general applicability of the Rule in cases
involving marriage regulation. Justice Marshall, writing for the majority, opined
that "[b]y reaffirming the fundamental character of the right to marry, we do not mean
to suggest that every state regulation which relates in any way to the incidents of or
prerequisites for marriage must be subjected to rigorous scrutiny. 252 Given the obser-
vations of several Justices, one must ask if the Court might use these "cracks" in the
precedent to diminish the fundamental nature of the right to marry in the Ban Case.
Less than ten years later, however, the Court decided Turner v. Safley, a case in-
volving prisoners' rights in which the Court evaluated the constitutionality of a regu-
lation that prohibited prisoners from marrying without prior approval of the prison
superintendent.5 3 Proceeding on the assumption that heightened review applies,
consistent with the Rule, the Court used Turner to establish that "when a prison
regulation impinges on inmates' constitutional rights, the regulation is valid if it is
reasonably related to legitimate penological interests." 254 The Turner Court lowered
247 Id. at 398.
248 Id.
249 Id. at 399.
250 See id. at 396-97.
251 See id. at 398-400.
252 Id. at 386 (majority opinion). Justice Powell's concurrence makes this same point. Id.
at 397 (Powell, J., concurring).
253 482 U.S. 78, 82 (1987).
254 Id. at 89.
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the level of review that normally applies to fundamental rights cases because "[s]ub-
jecting the day-to-day judgments of prison officials to an inflexible strict scrutiny
analysis would seriously hamper their ability to anticipate security problems and to
adopt innovative solutions to the intractable problems of prison administration. 255
In other words, the Turner Court created its own exception to the Rule in prisoners'
rights cases. Thus it is fair to read Turner as a case that supports the Rule that height-
ened review applies in cases involving the fundamental right to marry except in the
prison context where there are justifiable administrative reasons for applying rational
basis review.
Clearly, the prison context is a unique situation, and the Court lowered the level
of review with respect to all fundamental rights in the prison context. Importantly,
however, prison regulations that discriminate on the basis of race in an effort to regu-
late marriage undoubtedly would have to pass strict scrutiny. The equal protection
concerns do not disappear merely because a right is not fundamental. Ironically,
equal protection analysis becomes most important when rights are not fundamental,
especially when a suspect class is burdened by the regulation. This is why it is
important for courts, pursuant to the Rule, to follow the Proper Methodology as a
matter of judicial integrity.
All of this notwithstanding, it is worth emphasizing that the Turner Court re-
affirmed that marriage is a fundamental right, citing to Zablocki, and explicitly empha-
sized that Zablocki applies to prisoners.256 Moreover, the Court also struck down
the regulation even under rational basis review. 257 The Court carefully explained
that "[m]any important attributes of marriage remain... after taking into account
the limitations imposed by prison life. 258 Those incidents of marriage, including
emotional support and other legal rights, "are unaffected by the fact of confinement
or the pursuit of legitimate corrections goals. 259
In light of the Court's reasoning and holding, Turner diminishes the potential
significance of Justices Stewart's and Powell's concerns about whether marriage
should be a fundamental right. It also diminishes Justice Marshall's suggestion in
Zablocki that some marriage regulations do not need to be subjected to heightened
review. Turner is an exception to the Rule that admittedly fits into Justice Marshall's
observation, but it is still just that-an exception. It is inconceivable that the Court
in the Ban Case would use Turner as precedent for lowering the level of review in
intersection cases involving fundamental rights and gays. If that were to happen,
it would reflect the Court responding to a widespread animosity toward gays,
255 id.
256 See id. at 95 (holding that the lower court erred in finding Zablocki does not apply to
prisoners).
257 Id. at 97.
258 Id. at 95.
'59 Id. at 96.
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undoubtedly the result of the normalization of heterosexuality. That result should
call into question the Court's integrity.
B. More Lessons from Bowers and Lawrence
This, of course, is a focus of the current debate in the Ban Case: should the
analysis follow the Rule and the Exceptions? Moreover, the (perhaps fading) echoes
of Justices Stewart's and Powell's admonitions in Zablocki about creating funda-
mental rights were a primary concern of the Bowers Court: 'The Court is most vulner-
able and comes nearest to illegitimacy when it deals with judge-made constitutional
law having little or no cognizable roots in the language or design of the Constitution."260
This concern also surfaced with resounding vibrance in Lawrence. Recall that in
Lawrence, the majority held that the ban on sodomy between persons of the same sex
violated the right of privacy under substantive due process.261 Justice O'Connor con-
curred in the Court's holding to strike down the state law, but she would have based
the decision on equal protection grounds and left open the question of whether a
sodomy law that criminalized all sodomy violates substantive due process.262 In the
dissent, Justice Scalia, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Thomas, opined
that the case did not involve a fundamental right or violate equal protection.263 Justice
Thomas dissented separately to clarify that he, like Justice Stewart, did not think that
there is a general right of privacy in the Constitution.264
The Lawrence Justices at least called the substantive due process and equal pro-
tection analyses by their correct names. Nevertheless, they, like some of the Justices
in Zablocki, disagreed on the question of whether to place their holding on one or the
other. In my opinion, the confusion stems from two primary sources. First, the Bowers
Court committed the "Collapsible Error," and second, although the Lawrence Court
avoided making that mistake, it did so in a way that indicated it did not even fully
understand what the Collapsible Error is. Consequently, the Lawrence Court missed
an opportunity to clarify how the Proper Methodology should work in an intersection
case, particularly one involving sexual orientation.
1. The "Collapsible Error"
Regardless of one's view on the intellectual exploration about defining rights
under substantive due process narrowly (Does one have a right to commit suicide?265)
260 Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 194 (1986).
261 See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
262 See id. at 584 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
263 See id. at 586-605 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
264 Id. at 605-06 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (referring to Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S.
479, 527 (1965) (Black, J., dissenting)).
265 See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702,723 (1997) (upholding a physician-assisted
suicide ban). For an excellent comparative analysis of Glucksberg and Lawrence, see Brian
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or broadly (Does one have a right to die with dignity?266), one point seems clear: the
right cannot be defined in a way that subsumes the equal protection issue into the
substantive due process analysis. Stated alternatively, the right cannot be defined by
the class of persons adversely affected by the underlying law. I call this mistake the
"Collapsible Error."
The existence of the Collapsible Error problem itself might be the result of the
way issues are popularly phrased. Specifically, it is much easier to talk about same-
sex marriage, gay marriage, gay adoption, homosexual sodomy, or the black vote, for
example, than it is to phrase discussions in a discourse that separates the person from
the activity. Imagine talking about "white sodomy," which hardly makes any sense
even in popular discourse, but it seems bizarre in legal discourse. Nevertheless, if the
constitutionality of a ban on "white sodomy" were ever to become an issue, it is un-
imaginable that "white" would be considered merely an adjective to describe a pos-
sible right. Without a doubt, "white" in this context would be acknowledged as a
facial racial classification because "white" represents people. A court would no more
ask if the "right to engage in white sodomy" is fundamental, than it would ask if the
"right to engage in black voting" is. Thus, it is far more likely that such laws would
be judged irrational and motivated by animus toward gays and blacks, respectively.
Committing the Collapsible Error was the primary methodological mistake of the
Bowers Court, which held that there is no fundamental right to engage in homosexual
(class of persons) sodomy (underlying right).267 Compounding the error, the District
Court dismissed a heterosexual couple who wanted to challenge the law but was held
to lack standing because the law was not enforced against heterosexual couples.268
This holding was not challenged on appeal, and therefore, the issue before the Court
was whether the law as applied to homosexuals was constitutional.269
Notwithstanding the obvious equal protection element the Court built into the
definition of the right, the Court ignored the Rule and analyzed the case as only a sub-
stantive due process one.270 Because the Court held there is no such fundamental
right, as some Justices on the Lawrence Court opined,27' the law merely had to meet
rational basis review as a matter of due process methodology. Under that standard,
the law was upheld, because the Court held that the fact that the majority of the state
legislature found homosexual sodomy to be immoral was a legitimate reason to
Hawkins, Note, The Glucksberg Renaissance: Substantive Due Process Since Lawrence v.
Texas, 105 MICH. L. REv. 409 (2006).
266 Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 722.
267 Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
268 Id. at 188 n.2.
269 Id. ("The only claim properly before the Court, therefore, is Hardwick's challenge to the
Georgia statute as applied to consensual homosexual sodomy.").
270 Id. at 190.
271 See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 586 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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outlaw it.272 The way the Bowers Court phrased the issue unfairly and unconstitu-
tionally collapsed the equal protection analysis into the substantive due process
analysis. This deviation from the Proper Methodology--committing the Collapsible
Error-grossly undermined the Bowers Court's integrity.
2. Maintaining Judicial Integrity
It is important forjudges, particularly Supreme Court Justices, to apply the Proper
Methodology in intersection cases to protect their judicial integrity, among other rea-
sons. Toward this goal, it is essential for judges to avoid participating in the denial
of due process and equal protection, which they do when they commit the Collapsible
Error. Admittedly, because it is the Court's role to say what the law is,273 it is impos-
sible as a matter of constitutionality for it to render decisions that violate due process
or equal protection. As equality-minded people, however, it is all the more important
to explore and demonstrate how committing the Collapsible Error can deny due process
and equal protection as a practical matter.
When the equal protection analysis is collapsed into the substantive due process
analysis, the result arguably is a judicial denial of both due process and equal pro-
tection, because the Rule and the Exceptions provide the Proper Methodology. Under
the Rule, a court should apply heightened review if either a suspect class or a funda-
mental right is targeted by a law, unless one of the Exceptions applies. The Rule pre-
sumes that a law must be justified under the highest level of review that is involved
in the case.
Thus, in a non-obvious intersection case, a group burdened by a law has a due
process right to have a court apply equal protection analysis if the answer to the
fundamental rights question is negative. This is particularly true if the case involves
an established suspect or quasi-suspect class, but it also is true in non-obvious cases
where the targeted group might be a suspect or quasi-suspect class if only the court
analyzed the issue. Otherwise, equal protection is meaningless to the targeted group
with respect to laws that discriminate against it. Moreover, the targeted group also
has an equal protection right to have a court apply due process analysis. Otherwise,
the group's members lose an opportunity to have a higher level of review apply, which
would be the case if the right were already established as fundamental or would be
placed in that category if the Court considered the question. The only reason to deviate
from the Rule is because one of the Exceptions applies. The targeted group also has
272 Bowers, 478 U.S. at 196 ("The law, however, is constantly based on notions of moral-
ity, and if all laws representing essentially moral choices are to be invalidated under the Due
Process Clause, the courts will be very busy indeed.").
273 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803); see Richard H. Fallon, Jr.,
Marbury and the Constitutional Mind: A Bicentennial Essay on the Wages of Doctrinal
Tension, 91 CAL. L. REV. 1 (2003).
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due process and equal protection rights to have the Exceptions considered, because
the Exceptions are important in and of themselves. For a law to fail rational basis
review under an Exception is quite remarkable and symbolically noteworthy.
When a case fits into the IIl Motives Exception, it is even more important to
highlight this reality for the reasons discussed above.274 Moreover, the Ill Motives
Exception is more likely to be relevant under equal protection because that analysis
is focused on who should enjoy the underlying right. If equal protection is not a
central concern of a court in such cases, then any legislative animosity or prejudice
behind a law is less likely to be considered or be an integral concern by the reviewing
court. If the animus comes from the court itself, even as a result of a tendency to
normalize differences, it is impossible for it to be adequately exposed and avoided.
But arguably an ill motive-from prejudice to hostility-is the motivation (legislative
and/or judicial) for defining the right by the targeted group.
3. Lawrence's Attempt to "Right" Bowers
The Lawrence Court deserves credit for correcting the Collapsible Error com-
mitted by the Bowers Court, although it probably was not even aware of what it had
done. Specifically, the Lawrence Court understood that the right at issue in the case
should not be defined as "a right to engage in homosexual sodomy. '275 Rather the
Court chose to define the right without reference to the group targeted by the law and
thereby avoided committing the Collapsible Error. This is important because the
Lawrence Court avoided building an inequality into the analysis ab initio. This step
alone stopped some of the judicial due process and equal protection harms that Bowers
had imposed on gays. In turn, the Lawrence Court restored some of the judicial integ-
rity that was lost by the Bowers Court because of that Court's deviation from the
Proper Methodology.
Moreover, the Lawrence Court promoted the equal protection and due process
rights of gays when it defined the right at stake in a neutral way. In other words, by
defining the right as one of "liberty"-an established fundamental right2 76 -the
Lawrence Court created a presumption that gays (and everyone) have the right.
Similarly, if the Court had defined the right as "sodomy," it also would have created
a presumption that everyone either has or does not have the right depending on state
laws. The extent that the right could be regulated or denied to certain groups would
depend on rebutting the presumption under equal protection principles consistent
with the Proper Methodology. The state would have to justify the burden or denial
under the applicable standard of review, If the right is placed in the fundamental
rights realm-however the Court defines it-laws burdening the right must pass
274 See supra Part II.C.3.
275 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 566-67 (majority opinion).
276 See id. at 574.
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heightened review.277 If the right is not deemed fundamental, ordinarily subjecting
the law to rational basis review,278 it cannot burden certain groups without meeting
whatever standard of review is required under equal protection.
Quite significantly, the state's proffered justification for the law cannot be based
upon a rationale that reverts the analysis to the Collapsible Error problem. This is
true regardless of what level of review applies to a case. It ought to be unconstitu-
tional for a court to uphold a law-under any standard of review-by using a
methodology that itself denies due process and equal protection.
Significantly, when courts commit the Collapsible Error, they leave themselves
vulnerable to accusations that their methodology stems from ajudicial prejudice or
hostility toward the group burdened by the law. Because, in effect, the Collapsible
Error creates an (unconstitutional) irrebuttable presumption that the underlying right
(homosexual sodomy) is not fundamental, and therefore laws infringing on it only
have to meet rational basis review. Otherwise, there would not be a need to define
the right by the targeted group. This is especially true in cases where the status of the
group under equal protection is subject only to rational basis review as decided by
the Court.
Committing the Collapsible Error when the status of the group is unknown under
equal protection, as it is with gays, is especially pernicious because a court is able
to avoid deciding the group's status under equal protection. To leave a group's status
in abeyance makes sense under the umbrella of the Principle, but even then only to
a point. Certainly when a court deviates from the Proper Methodology in order to
avoid deciding the group's status under equal protection analysis, the court's integrity
rightfully should be called into question.
On returning to Bowers and Lawrence, assume the right to engage in sodomy is
a fundamental right. This is "easier" to accept if the right is defined more broadly
as one of liberty, and perhaps this is why the Lawrence Court chose to define it that
way.279 Nevertheless, the point is the same. The state cannot meet strict scrutiny by
relying on a tautological rationale that defines the right by the group. For example,
the state cannot argue that an anti-sodomy law is necessary to limit a fundamental
right (sodomy) to certain people (heterosexuals) because the right, although ostensibly
neutrally defined (sodomy), by definition includes only the people (heterosexuals)
who fall within the definition of the right (heterosexual sodomy). Under due process
analysis, if the state can proffer some other necessary or compelling justification for
the anti-sodomy law, neutrally defined, then it would be constitutional.
Recall that the statute in Lawrence targeted homosexual sodomy on its face, but the
Court explicitly avoided the equal protection analysis.28° Significantly and ironically,
277 See, e.g., Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720 (1997).
278 See, e.g., City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 439-41 (1985).
279 See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 566-67.
280 See id.
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the Court also could not analyze the law without "dealing with" and thereby acknowl-
edging the sexual orientation discrimination inherent in the law. Under substantive
due process, the Court held that protecting morality was an inadequate justification
for the law. 8' In fact, the Lawrence Court could find no other justification for the
law, which is why the Court's rationale puts it in the Logical Exception; it failed
rational basis review. Without a neutral justification for the law, it is irrational even
if a fundamental right is involved.
This Article pushes the analysis one step further, and this is why the Ill Motives
Exception is independently important. If a state or court cannot justify the law with-
out committing the Collapsible Error, then it must be unconstitutional. Moreover, if
the only way to justify a law is by relying on the Collapsible Error, then it seems clear
the law is ill-motivated; it is targeted at a particular group and the right is defined by
the group. This is true even if the law only implicitly targets the disfavored group
by defining the right to include only the favorable group-"heterosexual marriage."
Accordingly, it is within the Ill Motives Exception. In the final analysis, this is ex-
actly where Lawrence belongs. The Lawrence Court avoided the Collapsible Error
that was committed by the Texas legislature, but only because the Court held there
was no rational reason for the law and acknowledged, if not emphatically but by
reference to Romer, that prejudice and hostility against gays does exist.282
A word of caution. By pointing this out, I am not suggesting the motivation to
hurt the targeted group is necessarily the result of reflection, although on some level
of consciousness most people are aware of their biases. Most of the time, a person's
biases result in non-reflective prejudicial behavior because the biases result from
ingrained lessons about the meaning and significance of differences among people. 83
Recall Justice Kennedy's admonition in Garrett about unreflective or reflexive preju-
dice against persons with disabilities. 284 He acknowledged this phenomenon and then,
ironically, concluded that was not what was happening throughout the country (at
least with respect to states qua states), notwithstanding the congressional record
supporting the opposite conclusion.8 5 The irony highlights the phenomenon.
Respectfully, another example presents itself with Justice O'Connor's concurrence
in Lawrence. In Lawrence she starts the analysis with equal protection. Significantly,
her analysis relies heavily on the rationales in Moreno (involving hippies) 286 and
Cleburne (involving persons with "mental retardation"), 287 the cases that support the
281 See id. at 577 ("[T]he fact that the governing majority in a State has traditionally viewed
a particular practice as immoral is not a sufficient reason for upholding a law prohibiting the
practice ... ").
282 See id. at 574-75.
283 See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
284 See Bd. of Tr. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 374-75 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring); see also supra Part I.C.3.c.
285 Garrett, 531 U.S. at 375-76.
286 See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 579-80 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
287 See id.
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proposition that "a bare... desire to harm a politically unpopular group" is never
sufficientjustification for a law. 288 Her analysis culminates with the conclusion that
the sodomy law seems to be "born of animosity," the primary reason Colorado's
Amendment 2 was struck down in Romer.289 The Amendment prohibited "all laws
or policies providing specific protection for gays or lesbians from discrimination by
every level of Colorado government. "290 In short, under the terminology of this
Article, Justice O'Connor's rationale puts Lawrence into the Ill Motives Exception
and that ends the analysis. Cutting off the analysis for this reason is a dramatic and
symbolic judicial condemnation of discrimination.
By starting with equal protection, Justice O'Connor quickly realized the law was
motivated by animus toward gays and held the law unconstitutional. Moreover, this
resolution allowed Justice O'Connor to avoid the need to engage in a substantive due
process analysis. This approach provides the greatest respect to state sovereignty as
Justices Stewart and Powell highlighted in Zablocki.29 Correlatively, by avoiding
the substantive due process analysis, Justice O'Connor would have spared the Court
the criticism that attaches to creating substantive due process rights, especially when
it is unnecessary for it to do so. Moreover, she also avoided the need to engage in the
endless and intractable debate about whether to define rights narrowly or broadly.
Admittedly, states could enact laws criminalizing all sodomy, arguably invading the
broadly defined fundamental right of privacy of consenting adults. Justice O'Connor
is correct to point out that states could outlaw all sodomy (like the Bowers statute),
but "so long as the Equal Protection Clause [not part of the Bowers Court's separate
and explicit reasoning] requires a sodomy law to apply equally to the private con-
sensual conduct of homosexuals and heterosexuals alike, such a law would not long
stand in our democratic society."'2 92
Justice O'Connor's concurrence seemed to hit the nail on the head, except for
parts of her opinion that contribute to the intellectual confusion in the area of sexual
orientation discrimination. Consider that even as Justice O'Connor exposed the ani-
mosity behind the statute in Lawrence, she hinted that discrimination based on sexual
orientation might be rational for the purpose of protecting the traditional institution
of marriage.293 Her use of the word "rational" implies that she would not consider
sexual orientation a suspect classification. But this implication is questionable in
288 Id.
289 Id. at 583 (citing Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996)).
29 Romer, 517 U.S. at 629.
291 See Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978).
292 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 584-85. Theoretically, Justice O'Connor is correct, but unfortu-
nately, the reality is that a facially neutral law can be and is applied unfairly only to gays. This
is the Bowers case. Given that laws like those in Romer and Lawrence are motivated by ani-
mosity, it is illogical to think that the dominant group will think it needs to vote to protect itself
from invasions of privacy even if, or especially if, the secondary effect of supporting their own
protective legislation results in the protection of gays.
293 Id. at 585 (suggesting that it might be rational to protect national security).
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light of a statement elsewhere in her opinion that the sodomy law could not pass
"any standard of review,"294 implying that sexual orientation might be a suspect
classification requiring heightened scrutiny. She might also have been suggesting
that a higher level of review would apply in the Ban Case because under the Rule
marriage is a fundamental right. Because Justice O'Connor did not analyze equal
protection separately, one can only speculate about where gays would end up in her
equal protection analysis.
Justice O'Connor seemed to be laying a foundation for distinguishing Lawrence
from the future Ban Case that might be decided by the Court. The fact that she felt she
needed to do this raises an inference that she-clearly an equality-minded Justice-
is open to concluding that such bans are constitutional. The normalization of hetero-
sexuality, in reality, underlies the need to protect the traditional institution of marriage
that defines it as between a man and a woman.
Preserving the "traditional institution of marriage" cannot justify limiting marriage
to heterosexuals because the "traditional institution of marriage" is tautologically de-
fined by heterosexuality. Justice O'Connor' s suggestion in Lawrence, the very case
in which she quickly pointed out the animosity toward gays behind the anti-homosexual
sodomy law, indicates she is unaware of the built-in inequality and denial of due process
that attaches to committing the Collapsible Error in the marriage context. But if the
Court defines marriage as "heterosexual marriage" to justify bans on "gay marriages,"
then it is committing the Collapsible Error. One who commits the Collapsible Error in
the analysis perhaps cannot even see the prejudice (or more extreme motives) behind
the methodological mistake.
4. Lawrence: A Missed Opportunity
Notwithstanding the Lawrence Court's courage in overruling Bowers and thereby
correcting the Bowers Court's Collapsible Error, from a different perspective the
Lawrence Court also applied an improper methodology. 295 First, because Lawrence
is a Logical (or Ill Motives) Exception case, it was unnecessary under the Principle
to analyze whether a fundamental right was involved. But Lawrence itself is a unique
case because the Court used it to overrule Bowers, a case that was premised on the
Collapsible Error. Without realizing the importance of correcting that, the Lawrence
Court nevertheless knew Bowers was wrong, and by defining the right neutrally as
294 Id.
295 See Cass R. Sunstein, What Did Lawrence Hold: OfAutonomy, Desuetude, Sexuality,
and Marriage, 2003 SUP. CT. REV. 27, 30 ("Lawrence's words sound in due process, but much
of its music involves equal protection."). Aside from the procedural "mistakes" in Lawrence,
its holding is limited in other ways as well. See, e.g., Katherine M. Franke, The Domesticated
Liberty of Lawrence v. Texas, 104 COLUM. L. REv. 1399 (2004) (centering the opinion in
heterosexism); Berta E. Hernandez-Truyol, Querying Lawrence, 65 OHIO ST. L.J. 1151
(2004) (same).
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liberty, which is an established fundamental right, the Lawrence Court was doing its
best to "right" Bowers.
Perhaps if the Court had understood the nature of the Collapsible Error, it could
have exposed the error for what it is and used Lawrence to clarify that the Proper
Methodology applies in intersection cases involving sexual orientation. Instead, the
Lawrence Court's approach arguably enables the ongoing discrimination against gays,
because they remain subject to a case-by-case analysis of their rights under substantive
due process, and they do not enjoy even knowing whether they are entitled to height-
ened review under equal protection. Moreover, the possibility or probability of com-
mitting the Collapsible Error in sexual orientation discrimination cases is high. It is
worth highlighting that the Lawrence Court avoided the Error, but only because it held
the law was irrational. In this way, the Lawrence Court also participated in the denial
of gays' due process and equal protection rights.
Because the Lawrence Court wanted to reconsider Bowers, it really was approach-
ing the case as a non-obvious one, and thus the Court could have proceeded on due
process or equal protection analyses. The Proper Methodology intuitively called for
the Lawrence Court to engage in an equal protection analysis because the law in
Lawrence criminalized sodomy only between persons of the same sex. It was a
facial classification based on sexual orientation.
The Lawrence Court had an opportunity to finally decide where sexual orientation
fits in the equal protection paradigm. Interestingly, Professor Suzanne Goldberg notes
that the Court has not added a suspect or quasi-suspect class to the list since 1976.296
Yet strong arguments can be made that gays meet all three criteria-immutability,
history of discrimination, and political powerlessness-that the Court traditionally
uses to evaluate suspectness.297 It is unclear how these criteria are weighted or what
combination triggers heightened scrutiny. Logically, meeting all three criteria makes
for the strongest case, meeting two a stronger case, and meeting only one the weakest.
But the cases increasingly tend to be all over the map. Cleburne provides an ex-
ample at one extreme because people with "mental retardation" arguably meet all
three criteria, as even Congress noted in amassing its record to support the ADA, but
the Cleburne Court actually overruled the Fifth Circuit on this issue and held they
were not even a quasi-suspect class.298 At the other extreme, laws that classify on
the basis of race and discriminate against whites are still subject to strict scrutiny.299
In those cases, the only criteria present is "immutability," because whites are not
politically powerless and historically have not been discriminated against."
296 Goldberg, supra note 13, at 485 (noting that the addition of sex/gender as a quasi-suspect
classification was the last addition to the category).
297 See United States v. Carolene Prod. Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938); see also Simson, supra
note 209, at 368-75.
298 See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
299 See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
30o See Suzanna Sherry, Selective Judicial Activism in the Equal Protection Context:
Democracy, Distrust, and Deconstruction, 73 GEo. L.J. 89, 118-19 (1984) (suggesting that
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As an observation, it must be pointed out how unfair it is that persons with
disabilities are denied heightened review status but whites are entitled to it. Stated
alternatively, a group that is the target of widespread discrimination and prejudice,
so much so that Congress invoked its section 5 power to enact the ADA on their be-
half years after Cleburne, still could not persuade the Court of a need to give it sus-
pect classification status even though the group meets all three traditional criteria.
Moreover, no member of the Cleburne, Garrett, or Lane Courts expressed anything
but compassion for persons with disabilities.3"' Justice Kennedy astutely acknowl-
edged that some people can harbor unreflective prejudice toward others.30 2
In contrast, with absolutely no history of prejudice or discrimination against
whites, the Court readily gave suspect classification status to them.30 3 Admittedly,
race is immutable. It seems of the three traditional criteria, "immutability" is the
weakest because the Constitution protects all kinds of choices. Choosing to belong
to a non-Christian religion, for example, nevertheless might put one in a group with
a history of discrimination and concomitant lack of political power. The latter two
criteria seem much more important because they directly tap into one of the roles the
Court is called upon to serve: to protect a political minority from political majority
oppression. This is an especially important and essential function of the Court with
respect to individual liberties under due process and equal protection." It is a matter
of judicial integrity. This is poignantly illustrated in an intersection case in which
no fundamental right is involved but the state-created right targets a suspect class
such as a religious group. For example, a state law that prohibited members of the
religious group from driving would have to pass strict scrutiny to be constitutional.
More likely, the Court would put it into one of the Exceptions, and the Ill Motives
would seem most apt.
It is curious that the Court is reluctant to tackle the equal protection status
question with respect to gays. Its reluctance seems unrelated to the Principle be-
cause both Bowers and Lawrence intuitively called for an equal protection analysis.
Ironically, the Lawrence Court explicitly chose to avoid equal protection because
it held that substantive due process would provide greater protection for gays.30 5 Is
political process theory is inapplicable in affirmative action context); see also Klarman, supra
note 48, at 314 (same).
301 See Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509 (2004); Bd. of Tr. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531
U.S. 356 (2001); Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 432.
302 Garrett, 531 U.S. at 375 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
303 See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 306.
31 See Ackerman, supra note 50, at 742 ("At the same time that we enrich the capacity of
constitutional law to perfect pluralist democracy, we must also reaffirm a second fundamental
mission for judicial review: to expound the ultimate limits imposed on pluralist bargaining by
the American constitutional system.").
305 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 575 (2003). Justice Kennedy opined:
Equality of treatment and the due process right to demand respect for
conduct protected by the substantive guarantee of liberty are linked in
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the Court hesitant to answer the equal protection question because, looking at the
traditional criteria, gays would seem to be entitled to be a suspect class?3 6 Even if
immutability is left out of the equation because of the conflicting scientific studies,3 7
the two strongest criteria are clearly present. Moreover, unlike "persons with disabil-
ities," some of the Justices on the Court are openly hostile toward gays.3"8 Congress
generally eschews any legislation that would prohibit sexual orientation discrimi-
nation.309 Without some ruling from the Court on this issue, in fact, it might be that
Congress has virtually no enforcement power under section 5 to protect gays from
widespread discrimination even if it wanted to.310
important respects, and a decision on the latter point advances both
interests. If protected conduct is made criminal and the law which does
so remains unexamined for its substantive validity, its stigma might
remain even if it were not enforceable as drawn for equal protection
reasons.
Id.
31 Professor Pamela Karlan suggests the Lawrence Court was concerned with the impli-
cations of an equal protection analysis, particularly in the marriage context. See Karlan, supra
note 129, at 1458-59.
307 Professor Janet Halley recognized over ten years ago how a limited focus on immuta-
bility misses the bigger picture about securing equality for gays. See Janet E. Halley, Sexual
Orientation and the Politics of Biology: A Critique of the Argument from Immutability, 46
STAN. L. REv. 503,506 (1994). On the relevance of immutability or characteristics beyond the
individual's control to change, see Clark v. Jetter, 486 U.S. 456 (1988) (holding that inter-
mediate scrutiny is the proper standard to apply in cases involving children born out of wed-
lock because laws should not burden children for choices their parents made); Frontiero v.
Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 682-88 (1973) (plurality opinion) (holding that gender is an
immutable characteristic; thus heightened review should apply).
308 See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620,644-45 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (stating that
Coloradans are "entitled to be hostile toward homosexual conduct" and relating moral dis-
approval of murder to moral disapproval of homosexuals).
309 But see the proposed Employment Non-Discrimination Act of 2001 (ENDA), S. 1284,
107th Cong. (2001), which failed to pass the Senate in 1996 and has not been addressed since
it was put on the Senate Legislative Calendar in 2002. If ENDA were to become law, it would
be subject to challenge under the "congruence and proportionality" test of Flores. See City
of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 508 (1997) (requiring "congruence and proportionality"
between an injury Congress seeks to prevent or remedy and the means it adopts).
310 Interestingly, many due process and equal protection decisions were decided years before
the Court started to develop an understanding of the scope of Congress's section 5 enforcement
power, which began in 1997 in City ofBoerne v. Flores. In Flores, the Court held that Congress
lacked power under the Fourteenth Amendment to require that, pursuant to the Religious
Freedom of Restoration Act (RFRA), strict scrutiny apply to evaluate laws of neutral and
general applicability that allegedly violate the Free Exercise Clause. Flores, 521 U.S. at 507.
The Flores Court admonished Congress that it lacked power to create substantive rights under
the Fourteenth Amendment, which was the effect of the RFRA because it required a higher level
of review than the Court said was called for in Employment Division, Department of Human
Resources of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990), where the Court upheld Oregon's denial
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These observations highlight why the III Motives Exception is so important. Why
cases that involve sexual orientation discrimination do not presumptively fall with the
Proper Methodology is mysterious. It is as if their claims are not worthy of inclusion.
It is reasonable to conclude that the confusion over the analysis that should apply
results from prejudice or hostility toward gays.
The observations in this Article also highlight why it is important to reject Justice
Scalia' s suggestion that local legislative successes, like those of the voters in Aspen,
Denver, and Boulder, make gays politically powerful. 3 1 The widespread political
movements across the country to limit marriage to a man and a woman belie any
suggestion that gays are a politically powerful group.3 12 Significantly, even when
they seek judicial protection, if anything, the Collapsible Error analysis above sug-
gests how widespread the prejudice and animosity against gays can be in some con-
texts.31 3 It reflects a reality that even some members of the Court, like many other
equality-minded people, probably think within the paradigm that normalizes
heterosexuality, reflecting a prejudice or even hostility toward gays. It is important
to unmask and explore this possibility as a matter of judicial integrity.
of unemployment benefits to Al Smith, who was dismissed from his job for ingesting peyote
during a religious ceremony in violation of the state's criminal laws. Flores, 521 U.S. at
532-36. For an excellent narrative of the case, see Mark Tushnet, The Story of City of Boerne
v. Flores: Federalism, Rights, and Judicial Supremacy, in CONSTITUTIONAL LAW STORIES
505 (MICHAEL C. DoRF ed., 2004).
Since Flores, the Court has decided a number of section 5 cases as it goes head-to-head
with Congress, consistent with separation of powers principles, to delineate the proper bound-
aries between legislative andj udicial power under the Fourteenth Amendment. One boundary
that is being delineated in the section 5 area relates to how much deference the Court will give
to Congress's findings that federal legislation is necessary to enforce the substantive provisions,
as decided by the Court, of the Fourteenth Amendment. See, e.g., Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S.
509, 528-29 (2004) (suggesting that the Court is more willing to accept Congress's findings
of a pattern of disability discrimination where a fundamental right is involved); Nev. Dep't
of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 722 (2003) (pointing to congressional findings in
upholding that the Family Medical Leave Act meets the "congruence and proportionality" test
and may successfully abrogate a state's sovereign immunity); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents,
528 U.S. 62,82-83, 89-91 (2000) (discounting congressional findings in striking down the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act because it failed the "congruence and proportionality"
test of Flores). But see United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 599 (2000) (discounting con-
gressional findings in holding Congress lacks Commerce Clause power to enact the Violence
Against Women Act, which also fails the "congruence and proportionality" test under Flores).
311 Romer, 517 U.S. at 645-46 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
312 See supra Part I.C.3.d.iii.
313 See supra Part II.B.1.
[Vol. 16:685
WHITHER SEXUAL ORIENTATION ANALYSIS?
SUMMARY
The Ban Case provides an opportunity to explore the Proper Methodology that
should be applied to evaluate the constitutionality of cases at the intersection of sub-
stantive due process and equal protection. While the Court functions on the general
Rule that it will apply heightened scrutiny if either a fundamental right or a suspect
class is involved in a case and apply rational basis review if neither is involved, it
properly deviates from the Rule in at least two situations.1 4 The Logical Exception
displaces the Rule in those cases in which the law fails rational basis review, even if
heightened review might otherwise apply.35 The Ill Motives Exception occupies a
unique place in the analysis and captures cases where the motive behind the law stems
from prejudice or animosity.316 This Exception is not only important symbolically,
but also because it challenges government officials, including judges, to be on guard
against ill motives that influence decisions that actually perpetuate inequality.3 7
Special care should be taken by courts to avoid committing the Collapsible Error,
which happens when the underlying right is defined by the group targeted by the
law.31" This Error has the potential to happen in the Ban Case, which is popularly
known as the gay marriage case. Injecting the popular discourse into legal analysis,
however, can result in judicial denial of due process and equal protection. This would
be the result of conflating the substantive due process question with the equal pro-
tection question. The injustice that comes from committing this error is aptly illus-
trated by the Bowers Court's holding that there is no "fundamental right to engage
in homosexual sodomy., 3 9 The Lawrence Court acknowledged the injustice that
emanated from Bowers and promoted the due process and equal protection of gays by
holding that intimate relationships between consenting adult gays are protected by
the "liberty" of the Due Process Clause. 320 Nevertheless, even the Lawrence Court
left gaping holes in the area of gay rights, largely stemming from its failure to follow
the Proper Methodology and address the question of whether classifications on the
basis of sexual orientation deserve heightened scrutiny.32' As long as issues about
gay rights are framed in ways that result in committing the Collapsible Error, the
equal protection question will be avoided even as it remains central to the definition
of the right. Applying the Proper Methodology is a matter of judicial integrity.
34 See supra Part I.C.
315 See supra Part I.C.1.
316 See supra Part I.C.2.
317 See supra Part I.C.3.a-b.
311 See supra Part II.B.1-2.
319 Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 US. 186, 191 (1985).
320 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 564 (2003).
321 See supra Part II.B.4.
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THE PROPER METHODOLOGY
THE RULE
The "Either/Or" Part:
Apply Heightened Scrutiny (HS) if either a
Fundamental Right (FR) and/or a Suspect Class (SC).
Is there a FR?
e
Yes
Is there a SC?
No
[Cleburne, Moreno,
Bowers]
[Korematsu, Loving,
Zablocki, Ban Case]
[Korematsu, [Cleburne, Moreno]
Loving, Ban
Case]/
Apply HS
Yes
Is there a SC? Is there a FR?
The "Neither/Nor" Part:
Apply Rational Basis (RB) if
neither a FR nor a SC.
Figure 1
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Figure 3
THE EXCEPTIONS
No need to apply HS because law fails RB.
Logical Ill Motives
This applies even if a FR or SC is This applies if the law is ill-motivated. I1
involved if law fails RB. span a continuum from stereotyping to pn
Lawrence - FR of privacy hostility. Currently, a law can be ill-moti,
Skinner - FR to procreate constitutional if another legitimate jus
Romer- FR and SC questions left supports the law. Otherwise, ill motives m
open. unconstitutional.
Yick Wo, Strauder, Loving.
This Article also puts Skinner,
Moreno, Cleburne, Lawrence,
Korematsu, and Romer here.
Figure 2
I motives
judice to
vated and
stification
ake a law
THE COLLAPSIBLE ERROR PROBLEM
Is the right defined by the class?
No Yes
Proceed to apply the Rule If a court collapses the FR and SC question by
or Exceptions defining the right by the group, then the law is ill-
motivated on its face and should be per se
unconstitutional. [Bowers-no FR to engage in
homosexual sodomy. Ban Case could erroneously
analyze the question: is there a FR to gay marriage?]
